Saigon, 1920s – A l’hôpital militaire : une opération

Indochina has not been spared from the global infectious flu epidemic, firstly known as the “Spanish Flu,” which so painfully marked the years 1918 and 1919.

View the original French text here https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5454600n/f77

As early as June 1918, the chief medical officer of the Canton Consular Medical Post reported that a “flu-like” condition had appeared in Canton and Hong Kong, where British doctors had labelled it “Influenza”. But this epidemic, although extremely contagious, was benign. The disease was characterised by the following symptoms: fever, sometimes preceded by chills, ranging from 37º5 to 39º5, generalised aches and pains in the muscles, headache, dizziness, laryngitis, cough, lack of appetite, and constipation. Objective examination revealed only rather insignificant signs: redness of the pharyngeal pillars, negative lung auscultation. No recurrence of the fever. The illness lasted a week, leaving behind fatigue and weight loss. No deaths.

This epidemic disappeared from Canton at the beginning of July 1918, but reappeared in October and November 1918, accompanied, then, by its formidable series of complications, which caused many deaths. The complications affected mainly the respiratory system, causing pulmonary congestion and edema.

The flu made its appearance in July 1918 in the various territories of the Indochinese Union.

The epidemic reached its peak in August 1918, then gradually declined in September, without however completely disappearing. A new upsurge took place in October, and did not diminish until around April 1919.

The first epidemic wave, though considered relatively benign given the cases and deaths declared at the beginning of 1919, caused many fatalities.

From the morbidity and mortality point of view, we do not have many details on this period, having not initially required local government offices to make a compulsory declaration of influenza. But in many areas, provincial doctors estimate morbidity at 50% of the population.

Dr Bernard, Director of the Pasteur Institute in Saigon, detected, in a number of cases observed in Cochinchina, the presence of the Pfeiffer’s bacillus.

The breakdown by country of the cases and deaths which occurred during the months of November and December is as follows:

These figures, being much lower than the reality,  show that the epidemic was already severe in Indochina in 1918, since they exceeded by a third of the total cases of other epidemic diseases declared during that year.

In Tonkin, the epidemic was particularly severe:

– In Hà-Giang, on the border of China along the 3rd Military Territory, 600 deaths were observed during the month of December 1918: immediate measures were taken to limit the passage of Chinese across the border.

– In Sơn-La, amongst the local guards and the population of the provincial capital, 315 cases and 46 deaths were noted.

In Annam, the provinces of Thanh-Hoá (569 known deaths), Phan-Rang (299 cases), Tourane (266 cases) and Qui-Nhơn (250 cases) were most affected.

Crédit: Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images

No province of Cochinchina and Cambodia has been spared; in the latter country, the districts of Battambang, Stung-Treng, Kompong-Chhnang and Prey-Veng were the most affected.

In Laos, the flu appeared in August and September 1918 in the region below the 180th parallel, and in November and December it spread to Upper Laos; the provinces of Bassac and Attapeu, in Lower Laos, were particularly affected.

Prophylactic measures have been taken throughout Indochina to prevent the spread of the epidemic. The following circular, drawn up by the General Inspectorate of Sanitary and Medical Services, was communicated to the press at the beginning of November 1918 by the Government-General, with the intention of instructing the Indochinese population on the prophylactic measures, both individual and general, which it could take, and which would reduce the risk of contagion, at the same time as reducing the risks of pulmonary complications in those afflicted. It was distributed throughout all the territories of the Indochinese Union.

“For three months, an infectious disease, which is none other than the ‘flu’ or ‘influenza,’ has appeared in the various territories of the Indochinese Union, where it has formed some epidemic clusters; however, despite its widespread distribution, it has so far been relatively minor.

However, given that neighboring states have recently reported a greater virulence of this affection, transmission is expected to multiply during the winter season, possibly leading to pulmonary complications, always dangerous, for those affected.

The following measures may be taken advantageously to reduce the risk of contagion:

– Individual care of the nasal cavities, twice a day, morning and evening (instillation of gomenolato oil at 1/20 dilution or mentholated oil at 1/50 dilution), and of the throat (gargle morning and evening with iodized water at 1/1000 dilution);

– Avoid visiting the sick, who will be strictly isolated, and do not organise unnecessary large meetings;

– Wash, twice a day, the floors of houses, schools, offices, etc, using cresylated water.

The risks of pulmonary complications will be reduced considerably by practicing seriously, from the onset of the disease and throughout its duration, the individual treatments indicated above, to the nasal cavity and throat.”

Tim Doling is the author of the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020) and The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012)

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Foreign visitors to Việt Nam are often told erroneously that the Long Biên Bridge in Hà Nội, the Trường Tiền Bridge in Huế, and the Saigon Post Office are works by Gustave Eiffel. They are not.

For several years, Vietnamese and foreign historians alike have been frustrated by the amount of misinformation circulated regarding certain heritage structures in Việt Nam, the three best-known examples being the claims that Gustav Eiffel designed and built (i) the Long Biên Bridge in Hà Nội, (iii) the Trường Tiền Bridge in Huế, and (iii) the Saigon Post Office.

Apart from being incorrect, these claims do great disservice to the skills of Cochinchine Chief architect Marie-Alfred Foulhoux, Établissements Daydé et Pillé and Établissements Schneider et Letellier, the real authors of these three works.

The stories about the Long Biên Bridge in Hà Nội, and the Trường Tiền Bridge in Huế are not difficult to disprove, thanks to the wealth of documentary evidence:

Long Biên Bridge, Hà Nội

Tonkin – Hà Nội – Pont Doumer (today the Long Biên Bridge)

Some tourism training materials being circulated in Hà Nội still include the claim: “Cầu Long Biên được xây dựng từ ngày 12/8/1898, hoàn thành vào ngày 3/2/1902; do kiến trúc sư người Pháp Ep-phen thiết kế; dài 2290 m, cao 17m, nặng 17 nghìn tấn” (Long Biên Bridge was built from 12/8/1898 and completed on 3/2/1902; designed by French architect Eiffel; 2290 m long, 17m high, weight 17,000 tonnes).

However, the following documents, plus the prominently-displayed manufacturers’ plates on the bridge itself, show clearly that the bridge – actually measuring 1,680m in length – was designed and constructed by Daydé et Pillé, a company which was selected in an adjudication involving numerous major construction companies, the Eiffel successor company Société de construction de Levallois-Perret being one of the unsuccessful ones.

Please click on the titles at the end of each passage to view the original documents:

“Au concours ouvert, en 1897, pour la construction du pont d’Hanoï, se présentèrent les principales maisons de construction de France. Le projet de la maison Daydé et Pillé, de Creil (Oise) fut choisi” (At the open competition of 1897 for the construction of the Hà Nội bridge, the main construction firms in France were presented. The project by Daydé et Pillé, from Creil (Oise), was chosen). Paul Doumer, L’Indo-Chine française, souvenirs, Paris, 1905

“Ce pont, que l’on appelle « pont Doumer », du nom de l’ancien gouverneur de. l’Indo-Chine, a été construit de 1898 à 1902, par MM. Daydé et Pillé, à la suite d’un concours auquel toutes les grandes maisons de construction avaient été appelées à prendre part” (This bridge, which is named the “Doumer Bridge” after the former Governor of Indo-China, was built from 1898 to 1902 by MM. Daydé and Pillé, following a competition in which all the major construction companies had been invited to take part). Le Génie civil: revue générale des industries françaises et étrangères, Paris, 1909-04-03

“Le pont construit par MM. Daydé et Pillé s’arrête en effet au bord extérieur de la chaussée de la digue. Ce sont les Travaux Publics qui ont construit la partie du pont qui enjambe le Quai Clemenceau, la rampe d’accès actuelle, la plate-forme de la gare (qui n’a jamais été construite) et le reste du viaduc jusqu’à l’Avenue Bichot” (The bridge built by MM. Daydé and Pillé, indeed stops at the outer edge of the causeway of the dike. It was the Public Works Department which built the part of the bridge that spans Quai Clemenceau, the current access ramp, the station platform (which was never built) and the rest of the viaduct which extends up to the avenue Bichot). L’Éveil économique de l’Indochine: bulletin hebdomadaire, Hanoï, 1923-11-23

This company was also responsible for constructing 98 large metallic bridges on the Hà Nội-Vinh railway line during the period 1902-1905, including the famous Hàm Rồng Bridge in Thanh Hóa.
http://entreprises-coloniales.fr/inde-indochine/Dayde-Indo-Chine.pdf

Perhaps the confusion here occurred because Daydé et Pillé was one of several companies which eventually merged with Eiffel to form Eiffage métal, however that would not take place until 1964 – see https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eiffage_Métal

In his book Hanoi’s Architecture in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (NXB Xây dựng 1985), Đặng Thái Hoàng claimed that the bridge was built to an Eiffel company blueprint, but this claim cannot be substantiated.

Trường Tiền Bridge, Huế

Annam – Huế – Le Pont Thành-Thái (today the Trường Tiền Bridge)

A number of tourism training documents used in Huế claim that “Năm Thành Thái thứ 9 (1897), chiếc cầu trên được nhà cầm quyền Pháp (khi ấy Khâm xứ Trung Kỳ là Levecque) giao cho hãng Eiffel (Pháp) thiết kế (do Gustave Eiffel thiết kế) và xây dựng lại bằng sắt, đến năm Thành Thái thứ 11 (1899) thì hoàn thành và được mang tên vị vua này” (In the 9th year of Emperor Thành Thái (1897), the bridge was assigned to the Eiffel Company (designed by Gustave Eiffel) and rebuilt with iron by the French authorities (at that time the Résident Supérieur of Annam was Levecque), construction continued until the 11th year of Emperor Thành Thái (1899), when it was completed and named after this king).

However, the following French documents show that this bridge was actually designed and constructed by Schneider et Letellier (Société Schneider et Cie and Cie de Letellier) and that it was not completed until 1901:

“Vu le programme et cahier des charges de l’adjudication sur concours, pour la construction d’un pont métallique sur la rivière de Hué, approuvé le 26 mai 1897; Vu le projet déposé par la Société Schneider et Cie et Letellier, représentée par M. Dessoliers, ingénieur à Hanoi…” (With regard to the program and specifications of the competitive bidding for the construction of a metal bridge over the Huế river, approved on 26 May 1897; With regard to the project submitted by the Société Schneider et Cie et Letellier, represented by M. Dessoliers, engineer in Hà Nội). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1897-11

“Le pont de Hué: Un concours, basé sur ce programme, fut ouvert, en mai 1897, entre les constructeurs français. Le projet présenté par MM. Schneider et Cie et Letellier fut jugé supérieur à celui des autres concurrents, et le pont fut adjugé le 23 novembre 1897. Le montant des dépenses autorisées fut fixé à 723.926.50 francs.” (The Huế Bridge: A competition, based on this program, was opened in May 1897 between French builders. The project presented by MM. Schneider et Cie et Letellier was deemed superior to that of the other competitors, and the bridge construction was awarded to them on 23 November 1897. The amount of authorised expenditure was set at 723,926.50 francs). Paul Doumer, Situation de l’Indochine française de 1897 à 1901, 1901

“Les sieurs Schneider et Letellier ont reçu, le 18 oct. 1901, notification d’un ordre de service les invitant à se présenter dans les bureaux du premier arrondissement du service des travaux publics à Hanoï pour y prendre connaissance du décompte définitif des travaux du pont de Hué et à le signer pour acceptation” (Messieurs Schneider and Letellier received, on 18 October 1901, notification of a service order inviting them to come to the offices of the first district of the Public Works Department in Hà Nội to take note of the final account of the work on the bridge in Huế and to sign it for acceptance). Recueil des arrêts du Conseil d’État, Paris, 1908

The Schneider company, originally from Le Creusot (Saône-et-Loire), also built numerous large metallic bridges for the CFI Hà Nội-Vinh and CIY Hải Phòng-Hà Nội-Việt Trì railway lines, and would later give birth to the modern Schneider Electric.

Saigon Post Office

Saigon – L’Hôtel des Postes (Saigon Post Office)

Every year, millions of foreign guests visiting this high-profile building are informed by tour guides that it is “a work by Gustave Eiffel.” While the history of Saigon Post Office is less well documented than the two bridges mentioned above, available sources clearly indicate otherwise.

The “Eiffel Post Office” story is believed to have come originally from a document entitled “Hướng dẫn thuyết minh về các địa điểm tham quan trong thành phố” (Guidance notes about places to visit in the city), which was circulated in 1990 by the Sở Ngoại Vụ Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh to all tourist and other agencies dealing with foreign visitors. This document included the following advice: “Nhà BĐTP là do kỹ sư Guy-xta-vơ Ép-phen – Pháp – thiết kế và chỉ đạo xây dựng từ năm 1887-1891 thì hoàn thành theo phong cách chiết trung” (The Saigon Post Office is by French engineer Gustave Eiffel, who designed it and directed its construction from 1887-1891 in an eclectic style).

Today, the myth of the “Eiffel Post Office” is still taught to many tour guides, despite the fact that all the available historical data proves the claim to be erroneous.

Eiffel in Indochina

Gustave Eiffel, Ingénieur français (1832-1923), photo de Nadar ©MP/Leemage

According to Laurent Weill’s article “l’Entreprise Eiffel et la mise en valeur de l’Indochine, 1889-1965,” originally published in Histoire, économie & société, Année 1995, 14-2, the Eiffel company was founded in 1863 by Gustave Eiffel under the company name Gustave Eiffel et Cie, and established an office in Cochinchina in 1872:

The official lists of Eiffel’s works prepared by the Association des Descendants de Gustave Eiffel at www.gustaveeiffel.com/ show that, while the vast majority of the company’s achievements were located in France, it was also commissioned to build numerous structures in Cochinchina between 1872 and 1889.

These included, amongst others, railway bridges (Bình Điền, Tân An and Bến Lức viaducts on the Saigon-Mỹ Tho railway line), road bridges (Pont des Messageries maritimes, Pont de Cholon/Pont des Malabars, Pont de Ông Núi, Pont de Rạch Lăng, Pont de Bình Tây, Pont de Rạch Gia, Pont de Long Xuyên), markets (Long Châu, Cao Lãnh, Ô Môn, Tân Quy Đông and Tân An), filter wells and canal/creek towpaths, as well as the imposing headquarters of the Halles des Messageries fluviales on the Saïgon riverfront – see https://gustaveeiffel.com/ses-oeuvres/asie/

By 1889, the year in which Eiffel built his world-famous Eiffel Tower for the 1889 Universal Exposition in Paris, the company had offices in Saigon, Shanghai, Lisbon, Saint Petersburg and Buenos Aires, and representatives in Madrid and Naples. On 21 May 1890, the Cie des Établissements Eiffel was created, of which Gustave Eiffel controlled more than 50% of the capital (i.e. 4,643,068 francs).

However, in 1891-1893, Eiffel’s fortunes changed drastically, as his Paris Metro plan “Projet Eiffel de Métropolitain” was rejected by the Paris municipal authorities, and he himself became implicated in the financial and political scandal surrounding the failed French project to build a canal across the Panama Isthmus. Indicted in November 1892 in connection with the Panama scandal, Eiffel resigned from the board of directors on 10 January 1893. Eiffel then refused to permit the company to continue bearing his name, so a new board of directors was appointed and the company formally changed its name the Société de Constructions de Levallois-Perret (SCLP).

The Association des Descendants de Gustave Eiffel has prepared a comprehensive list of all of Eiffel’s works at www.gustaveeiffel.com/

The Eiffel successor company Société Constructions Levallois-Perret continued to play an important role in the development of the French colony, building much of Saïgon’s port infrastructure as well as a large number of the bridges on the North-South (Transindochinois) railway line. Eventually in 1937, confident that its founder’s reputation could no longer be dented by memories of the Panama scandal, the company changed its name to Société des Anciens Établissements Eiffel (SAEE) – see www.entreprises-coloniales.fr/inde-indochine/Eiffel-Indochine.pdf

Although the Maison Eiffel was responsible for numerous works in Cochinchina, its involvement in the design or construction of the Saigon Post Office is not mentioned anywhere in the official lists of Eiffel’s works prepared by the Association des Descendants de Gustave Eiffel – see https://gustaveeiffel.com/ses-oeuvres/asie/

Neither is it mentioned in any of the French colonial documentation about Eiffel stored in the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France, in the various branches of the National Archives in Việt Nam, or online at the French National Library website Gallica https://gallica.bnf.fr/.

Claims have also been made that even if Eiffel did not design or construct the Saigon Post Office, it could still have been Eiffel’s company which manufactured the iron frame of the Post Office.

One document does show that the iron frame of the Saigon Post Office was cast in France and shipped to Indochina:

“Achèvement de l’hôtel des postes et des télégraphes – 40,000 Piastres. Il reste à mettre sur l’hôtel des postes la grande charpente, qui est actuellement en cours de fabrication en France, puis tous les travaux de parachèvement qui ne peuvent être exécutés avant la pose de la charpente. Le crédit de 40,000 piastres sera suffisant pour achever” (Completion of the Post and Telegraph Hotel – 40,000 Piastres. There remains the installation of the great frame of the post office, which is currently being manufactured in France, none of the finishing work can be carried out before the installation of the frame. The credit of 40,000 piastres will be sufficient for completion). Procès-verbaux du Conseil colonial, Saïgon, 1887 

But again, no evidence exists that the Maison Eiffel built this iron frame, particularly since it is not mentioned in the official list of metal building frames manufactured by the company, prepared by the Association des Descendants de Gustave Eiffel – see https://gustaveeiffel.com/charpentes-metalliques/

In his book Hanoi – Biography of a City (Sydney, 2000), William Logan ventured the opinion that the fixation of the Vietnamese tourism industry with Eiffel might just be “another myth…. designed to bolster the pedigree of the French impact on the city.”

Saigon, 1890-1900 – Pont des Messageries maritimes: Saigon does have an authentic Établissements Eiffel structure – the single-arch former Pont des Messageries maritimes of 1882, thought to be the only one of its kind left in Asia – yet strangely this is rarely visited by tour groups

However, this fails to explain why in Saigon, where tour guides continue to promote the myth of an “Eiffel Post Office,” the single-arch former Pont des Messageries maritimes of 1882 – an authentic Établissements Eiffel structure thought to be the only one of its kind left in Asia – is rarely visited by tour groups.

For further details of the former Pont des Messageries maritimes, see www.historicvietnam.com/the-rainbow-bridge-a-true-eiffel-classic/

Marie-Alfred Foulhoux, true architect of the Saigon Post Office

No official documents or drawings bearing the name of the Saigon Post Office designer/builder have yet been found, but two contemporaneous newspaper accounts – Le Temps (Paris), 28 Février 1888, and L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architectural et artistique No 25, 15 Septembre 1891 – both clearly describe the work as being by the Chief Architect of Cochinchina, Marie-Alfred Foulhoux:

Le Temps (Paris), 28 Février 1888

“Saïgon a aussi ses monuments, son palais gouvernemental, datant de l’époque de l’amiral La Grandière; sa cathédrale et son palais de Justice, œuvres de l’architecte Foulhoux, un ancien de Cochinchine qui est toujours sur la brèche. M. Foulhoux construit actuellement un superbe hôtel des postes, dont les travaux sont menés avec une rapidité plus grande que celle de l’hôtel de la rue Jean-Jacques-Rousseau” (Saigon also has its monuments, its government palace, dating from the time of Admiral La Grandière; its cathedral and its courthouse, works of the architect Foulhoux, a former Cochinchinois who is always on the go. Foulhoux is currently building a superb post office, the work of which is being carried out with greater speed than that of the hotel on rue Jean-Jacques-Rousseau). Le Temps (Paris), 1888-02-28

L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architectural et artistique No 25, 15 Septembre 1891

“L’inauguratiou du nouvel hôtel des postes de Saigon qui devait avoir lieu le 14 juillet dernier a été remise au retour du gouverneur général. Ce monument, orné d’une façade des plus artistiques est particulièrement bien aménagé et bien compris pour les différents services auxquels il est destiné; il fait le plus grand honneur à l’habileté et au talent du distingué architecte en chef delà colonie, M. Foulhoux. Nos lecteurs n’ont pas oublié notre excellent ami qui a été le commissaire délégué de l’Indo Chine à l’Exposition de 1889 et auquel nous avons dû le magnifique palais des colonies construit en teck rouge de l’Indo-Chine” (The inauguration of the new post office in Saigon which was to take place on 14 July, was postponed until the Governor General returns. This monument, adorned with a most artistic facade, is particularly well fitted out for the various services it is intended for; it does the greatest honour to the skill and talent of the distinguished chief architect of the colony, M Foulhoux. Our readers have not forgotten our excellent friend, who was the deputy commissioner of Indo China at the 1889 Exposition, and to whom we owe the magnificent colonial palace, built in red teak from Indo-China). L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architectural et artistique, Paris, 1891-09-15

Was Henri Vildieu involved?

The book Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme (Nhà Xuất Bản Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh), published in 1998, still offers one of the best overviews of Saigon’s historic built heritage

The excellent book Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme (Nhà Xuất Bản Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh), published in 1998, claimed that the Saigon Post Office was “construite sur les plans de l’architecte Vildieu, Chef du Service des Batiments civils du Tonkin, avec l’aide de Foulhoux” (constructed on the basis of plans by architect Vildieu, Head of Public Buildings in Tonkin, with the aid of Foulhoux.” This claim has since been reproduced widely in many other books and articles about Saigon.

However, there is no evidence to support the idea that Foulhoux, then a senior figure in the Cochinchina government, would have been an assistant to Vildieu, who during the same period was a relatively junior architect, nor indeed is there any evidence that Vildieu was involved in any way in the design or construction of the Saigon Post Office.

A quick search of the official Indochina government publications on Gallica shows that Marie-Alfred Foulhoux (1840-1892) arrived in Cochinchina in 1869 and became Chef du Service des Bâtiments civiles en Cochinchine in 1872. He is believed to have been appointed Architecte-en-chef in 1879.

“FOULHOUX ALFRED, architecte en chef de l’Indo-Chine (Nécrologie) – La Construction moderne lui a consacré la notice suivante due à M. Charles Lucas: Mercredi 20 janvier (1892), est décédé subitement à Saigon (Cochinchine), M. Foulhoux, architecte, qui depuis vingt-cinq années habitait cette colonie, et avait été, en 1872, après la démission de M. Monnier, nommé par le ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, chef de la section des bâtiments civils du service des travaux d’architecture de la Cochinchine. C’est en cette qualité que M. Foulhoux avait tracé le plan de la ce partie neuve de la ville de Saigon, et fait élever le palais du gouverneur général, ainsi que plusieurs autres édifices publics tant à Saïgon que dans les autres villes de l’Indo-Chine française” (FOULHOUX ALFRED, chief architect of Indo-China (Obituary) – La Construction moderne devoted the following notice to him by M Charles Lucas: On Wednesday 20 January (1892), M Foulhoux, architect, died suddenly in Saigon (Cochinchina). For 25 years he lived in this colony, and after the resignation of Mr. Monnier in 1872, he was appointed by the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies as head of the Civil Buildings section of the Architectural Works Service of Cochinchina. It was in this capacity that M Foulhoux drew up the plan of this new part of the city of Saigon, and had the palace of the Governor General erected, as well as several other public buildings both in Saigon and in the other cities of French Indo-China). Société des architectes de l’Anjou, Angers, 1892

Documents show that Foulhoux was also responsible for four other civic buildings in Saigon, so that the Saigon Post Office was in fact his last work:

– Secrétariat général du gouvernement (1881)
– Palais de Justice (1885)
– Hôtel des douanes (1887)
– Palais du Lieutenant-gouverneur de Cochinchine (1890)
– Hôtel des postes (1891)

Meanwhile, Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) first entered service as an architect with the Indochina authorities in February 1885:

Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) entered colonial service in Hà Nội in 1885 and became an architecte 2nd class in the Service des bâtiments civils in 1895

“Architectes chefs de service du 2e classe: Vildieu, Auguste-Henri; Date de naissance – 6 sept 1847; Date de la dernière nomination – 14 juil 1895; Date d’entrée dans l’administration locale – 25 fév 1885” (Vildieu, Auguste-Henri; Date of birth – 6 September 1847; Date of last nomination – 14 July 1895; Date of entrance into local administration – 25 February 1885). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1902

Vildieu did not become Chef du service des bâtiments civils until 1895, three years after Foulhoux’s death:

“M Vildieu, architecte, chef du service des bâtiments civils, Président” (M Vildieu, architect, head of the civil buildings service, President). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1895

He remained an “architecte-adjoint” (assistant architect) and “Architecte chef de service de 2e classe” (architect head of service 2nd class) until as late as July 1902, over a decade after Foulhoux’s death:

“Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architect-adjoint” (Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), assistant architect). Les Tablettes coloniales: organe des possessions françaises d’Outre-mer, Paris, 1888-08-29

“Architectes chefs de service du 2e classe: Vildieu (Auguste-Henri); Date de naissance – 6 sept 1847; Date de la dernière nomination – 14 juil 1895; Date d’entrée dans l’administration locale – 25 fév 1885” (Vildieu (Auguste-Henri); Date of birth – 6 September 1847; Date of last nomination – 14 July 1895; Date of entrance into local administration – 25 February 1885). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1902

Vildieu was finally promoted to “Architecte 1re classe” and Architecte-en-chef of the Travaux publics de l’Indochine on 19 July 1902:

Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) became an architecte 1st classe and Architecte-en-chef in the Service des bâtiments civils in 1902; after his retirement in 1912 he was made Architecte-en-chef honoraire

“Par arrêté du Gouverneur général de l’Indo-Chine p. i., en date du 19 juillet 1902, rendu sur la proposition du Directeur général des Travaux publics: Sont promus dans le personnel des Travaux publics de l’Indo-Chine:
2° au grade d’architecte de 1re classe: M. Vildieu, Auguste, architecte de 2e classe” (By decree of the Acting Governor General of Indo-China, dated 19 July 1902, rendered on the proposal of the Director-General of Public Works: The following staff of Public Works of Indo-China are promoted to the grade of 1st class architect: M. Vildieu, Auguste, 2nd class architect). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1902-07

“Vildieu, Auguste: Date de la nomination au grade de Architecte-principal, chef du service: 19 juillet 1902” (Vildieu, Auguste: Date of appointment to the rank of Principal architect, head of the service: 19 July 1902). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1925

The works attributed directly to Vildieu are all situated in Hà Nội, and all of them date from the late 1890s to 1906, some time after Foulhoux’s death:

– Maison centrale (1899)
– Gare de Hanoi (1902)
– Travaux publics de l’Indochine (1902)
– Hôtel des postes (1905)
– Palais de Justice (1906)
– Mairie de Hanoi (1906)

This makes it all the more unlikely that Vildieu could have been the principal architect of a major building in Saigon which was completed nearly a decade earlier, when he was still an assistant architect.

When Vildieu retired in 1912, he was made Architecte-en-chef honoraire (Honorary Architect in chief) of the Travaux publics de l’Indochine:

“Par arrêtés du Gouverneur général de l’Indochine du 12 décembre 1912: Sont nommés, à compter du jour de leur radiation des cadres de l’activité, professeurs stagiaires dans le personnel français de l’Enseignement dans les pays de Protectorat de l’Indochine, pour servir en Annam: 1° Architecte en chef honoraire des Travaux publics de l’Indochine: M. Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architecte principal chef de service” (By decrees of the Governor General of Indochina of 12 December 1912: The following are appointed, from the day of their retirement, as trainee teachers in the French teaching staff in the countries of the Protectorate of Indochina, to serve in Annam: 1° Honorary Chief Architect of Public Works of Indochina: M. Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), chief architect, head of department). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1912

The above timeline shows clearly that, at the time the supposed Saigon Post Office collaboration took place, Foulhoux was Chief Architect of Cochinchina, while Vildieu was still a class 2 architecte-adjoint. Vildieu would only only become Foulhoux’s equal long after the latter’s death, being promoted to Chef du service des bâtiments civils en Annam et au Tonkin in 1893, and finally to class 1 architecte principal in 1902.

Thus, at the time of the Saigon Post Office project, Chief Architect Foulhoux was very clearly the senior of the two men, in terms of both age and authority, so that the idea of him being Vildieu’s assistant is very unlikely indeed.

Foulhoux and Vildieu did in fact work together on the construction of palaces for the Universal Exposition of 1889 in Paris, and Vildieu also subsequently worked in Cochinchina during the period 1892-1893:

Vue générale de l’exposition universelle de 1889

The Universal Exposition of 1889 project was organised “sous la direction de M. Louis Menrique, commissaire spécial de l’exposition coloniale, par MM. Sauvestre, architecte en chef des colonies françaises; Foulhoux, architecte en chef de l’Indo-Chine; Fabre, architecte du Cambodge; Vildieu, architecte du Tonkin; de Brossard, architecte adjoint, et Martin, inspecteur des bâtiments” (under the direction of M Louis Henrique, commissaire spécial de l’exposition coloniale, by Messrs Sauvestre, architecte-en-chef des colonies françaises, Foulhoux, architecte-en-chef de l’Indochine, Fabre, architecte du Cambodge, Vildieu, architecte du Tonkin, Brossard, architecte-adjoint, and Martin, inspector of buildings). Alfred Picard, Exposition universelle internationale de 1889 à Paris: rapport général par M. Alfred Picard. Travaux de l’Exposition, Paris, 1891-1892

However, all of the documents describing this collaboration in Paris make it clear that Foulhoux was in charge, and refer to Vildieu (and his colleague Fabre) as “architecte-adjoint” – in other words, Vildieu would have been Foulhoux’s assistant, not the other way round.

“Ces palais ont été construits par M. Foulhoux, architecte du gouvernement de la Cochinchine, et par MM. Fabre et Vildieu, ses adjoints, avec un respect de la vérité locale, une sagacité dans le choix des types, un amour des arts qu’ils voulaient reproduire et une sincérité de sentiment qui en font les plus authentiques des curiosités et les plus intéressantes des merveilles” (These palaces were built by M Foulhoux, architect of the government of Cochinchina, and by Messrs Fabre and Vildieu, his assistants, with respect for local truth, sagacity in the choice of building types, a love of the arts that they wanted to reproduce, and a sincerity of sentiment which makes them the most authentic of curiosities and the most interesting of wonders). Le Temps (Paris), 1889-05-04

“MM. Foulhoux, architecte en chef, et Vildieu, architecte adjoint, ont habilement dirigé les études et travaux de cette construction et de son aménagement intérieur.” (Messrs Foulhoux, chief architect, and Vildieu, deputy architect, skilfully directed the studies and works of this construction and its interior fittings). Le Génie civil: revue générale des industries françaises et étrangères, Paris, 1889-03-09

After this collaboration, Vildieu could also be found in 1892-1893 working in Saigon office as a Deputy Architect in the Service of Civic monuments:

COCHINCHINE FRANCAISE – SAIGON – Service des travaux publics: Rampant, architecte, chef du service; Foulhoux, architecte, chef de la section des bâtiments civils; Thil architecte, sous-inspecteur des bâtiments civils; Kerrien, chef de la section des ponts et chaussées; Vildieu, architecte adjoint au service des monuments civils (COCHINCHINE FRANCAISE – SAIGON – Public works service: Rampant, architect, head of the service; Foulhoux, architect, head of the civic buildings section; Thil, architect, sub-inspector of civic buildings; Kerrien, head of the bridges and roads section; Vildieu, assistant architect to the civic monuments service). Indicateur de la propriété foncière dans Paris et le département de la Seine, Paris, 1892

Foulhoux died suddenly on 20 January 1892, while Vildieu was still working in Saigon.

When Vildieu was appointed Chef du service des Bâtiments civils en Annam et au Tonkin on 15 June 1893, he ceased to be a member of staff of Bâtiments civiles de la Cochinchine:

“15 juin 1893. – Gouverneur général de l’Indo-Chine: M. Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architecte adjoint, est nommé architecte, Chef du service des bâtiments civils en Annam et au Tonkin, et cessera à partir de la date du présent arrêté de faire partie du personnel du service des bâtiments civils de la Cochinchine” (June 15, 1893 – Governor General of Indo-China: M Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), deputy architect, is appointed architect, Head of the civil buildings service in Annam and Tonkin, and will cease from the date of present decree to be part of the staff of the civil buildings service of Cochinchina). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1893-06

There is no evidence of any other architectural collaboration between the two men before Foulhoux’s death, apart from the 1889 Exposition universelle internationale project. As such, Vildieu’s involvement in the design and/or construction of Saigon Post Office cannot be substantiated.

The author has consulted three of the editors of the above-mentioned publication, Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme – Dr Natasha Pairaudeau, Dr François Tainturier and Dr Philippe Peycam – about the claim that Vildieu was chief architect of the Saigon Post Office, but understandably, since the work was produced over 20 years ago, none of them can recall the basis on which their book cited Vildieu as the chief architect of Saigon Post Office and Foulhoux as his assistant.

However, they all mention that back in 1998 their research for the book would not have included French archival material, and that in the absence (at that time) of internet access to online records, that research would have been heavily reliant on materials held in Saigon, in the then Municipal Library and in the ex-National Library.

Tonkin – Hà Nội – Palais de Justice et Prisons, a work by Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926)

Since no other collaboration between Foulhoux and Vildieu can be documented, the editors of Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme accept that their original claim about Vildieu’s involvement was incorrect, and that the reports in Le Temps (Paris) and L’Architecte-Constructeur citing Foulhoux, Architecte-en-chef in Cochinchine, as the sole architect of Saigon Post Office, not available to them in 1998, are likely to be accurate.

Setting the record straight

Nowadays, Việt Nam is no longer simply an adventure destination. It already attracts significant numbers of cultural tourists, including older, wealthier visitors who stay longer, take part in more cultural activities and spend more money. Such visitors expect and deserve to be given accurate historical information about Vietnamese heritage, rather than myths.

The continued propagation of erroneous information regarding the Long Biên Bridge in Hà Nội, the Trường Tiền Bridge in Huế and the Saigon Post Office should be a real concern to all those involved in the preservation and promotion of Vietnamese heritage, and it is hoped that this short summary of the relevant historical data will help to resolve any outstanding uncertainty on the subject

Thanks are due to Emmanuel Cerise, Dr Natasha Pairaudeau, Dr François Tainturier and Dr Philippe Peycam  for their assistance in the preparation of this article

Tim Doling is the author of the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020) and The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012)

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Du khách nước ngoài đến Việt Nam thường được kể rằng cầu Long Biên ở Hà Nội, cầu Trường Tiền ở Huế và Bưu điện Sài Gòn đèo là tác phẩm của Gustave Eiffel. Nhưng thông tin này hoàn không đúng.

Trong vài năm qua, các nhà sử học đã thất vọng vì lượng thông tin sai lệch được lan truyền về một số công trình di sản ở Việt Nam, ba ví dụ nổi tiếng nhất là tuyên bố rằng Gustav Eiffel đã thiết kế và xây dựng (i) Cầu Long Biên ở Hà Nội, (iii) Cầu Trường Tiền ở Huế, và (iii) Bưu điện Sài Gòn.

Thật ra những thông tin này không chính xác, những tuyên bố này làm giảm bớt danh tiếng của kiến trúc sư trưởng Nam Kỳ Marie-Alfred Foulhoux, Établissements Daydé et Pillé và Établissements Schneider et Letellier, là những tác giả thực sự của ba công trình này.

Không khó bác bỏ những tuyên bố cho rằng cầu Long Biên ở Hà Nội và cầu Trường Tiền ở Huế là công trình của Eiffel, nhờ vào  một số tài liệu khá phong phú:

Cầu Long Biên tại Hà Nội

Tonkin – Hà Nội – Pont Doumer (Cầu Long Biên)

Một số tài liệu đào tạo du lịch đang được lưu hành tại Hà Nội vẫn bao gồm tuyên bố: “Cầu Long Biên được xây dựng từ ngày 12/8/1898, hoàn thành vào ngày 3/2/1902; do kiến trúc sư người Pháp Ep-phen thiết kế; dài 2290 m, cao 17m, nặng 17 nghìn tấn.” 

Tuy nhiên, các tài liệu sau đây, cùng với tấm biển của công ty xây dựng được hiển thị nổi bật trên chính cây cầu trong lúc cây cầu mới được xây dựng, cho thấy rõ rằng cây cầu – thực tế có chiều dài 1.680m – được thiết kế và xây dựng bởi Etablissements Daydé et Pillé, một công ty được lựa chọn trong một cuộc thi đấu thầu và có sự tham gia của nhiều công ty xây dựng lớn, trong đó công ty kế thừa của Eiffel, là Société de Construction de Levallois-Perret là một trong những công ty không thành công.

Xin vui lòng nhấp vào tiêu đề ở cuối mỗi đoạn văn để xem các tài liệu nguyên bản:

“Au concours ouvert, en 1897, pour la construction du pont d’Hanoï, se présentèrent les principales maisons de construction de France. Le projet de la maison Daydé et Pillé, de Creil (Oise) fut choisi” (Tại cuộc thi đấu thầu năm 1897 về việc xây dựng cầu Hà Nội, các công ty xây dựng chính của Pháp đã có mặt. Dự án của Daydé et Pillé, từ Creil (Oise), đã được chọn. Paul Doumer, L’Indo-Chine française, souvenirs, Paris, 1905

“Ce pont, que l’on appelle « pont Doumer », du nom de l’ancien gouverneur de. l’Indo-Chine, a été construit de 1898 à 1902, par MM. Daydé et Pillé, à la suite d’un concours auquel toutes les grandes maisons de construction avaient été appelées à prendre part” (Cây cầu này, được đặt tên là “Cầu Doumer” theo tên cựu Thống đốc Đông Dương, được xây dựng từ năm 1898 đến năm 1902 bởi MM. Daydé và Pillé, sau một cuộc thi đấu thầu mà tất cả các công ty xây dựng lớn đã được mời tham gia). Le Génie civil: revue générale des industries françaises et étrangères, Paris, 1909-04-03

“Le pont construit par MM. Daydé et Pillé s’arrête en effet au bord extérieur de la chaussée de la digue. Ce sont les Travaux Publics qui ont construit la partie du pont qui enjambe le Quai Clemenceau, la rampe d’accès actuelle, la plate-forme de la gare (qui n’a jamais été construite) et le reste du viaduc jusqu’à l’Avenue Bichot” (Cây cầu do ông Daydé and Pillé xây dựng, thực sự dừng lại ở rìa ngoài của đường đắp cao con đê. Chính Sở Công chính đã xây dựng phần cầu bắc qua bến Clemenceau, hiện tại là đoạn đường dẫn đến cầu, sân ga (chưa được xây dựng) và phần còn lại của cầu cạn kéo dài đến đại lộ Bichot). L’Éveil économique de l’Indochine: bulletin hebdomadaire, Hanoï, 1923-11-23

Trong giai đoạn 1902-1905, Công ty Daydé and Pillé cũng chịu trách nhiệm xây dựng 98 cây cầu kim loại lớn trên tuyến đường sắt Hà Nội, trong đó có cầu Hàm Rồng nổi tiếng tại Thanh Hóa.
http://entreprises-coloniales.fr/inde-indochine/Dayde-Indo-Chine.pdf

Có lẽ một số người nghĩ sai rằng cầu Long Biên là công trình của Công ty Eiffel, vì rất lâu sau đó vào năm 1964, Công ty Daydé et Pillé là một trong số các công ty hợp nhất với Công ty Eiffel để tạo thành Công ty Eiffage métal – xem https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eiffage_Métal

Trong cuốn sách Hanoi’s Architecture in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Kiến trúc Hà Nội thế kỷ 19-20, NXB Xây dựng 1985), tác giả Đặng Thái Hoàng cho rằng cây cầu được xây dựng theo bản thiết kế của công ty Eiffel, nhưng tuyên bố này không thể chứng minh được.

Cầu Trường Tiền tại Huế

Annam – Huế – Le Pont Thành-Thái (Cầu Trường Tiền)

Một số tài liệu đào tạo du lịch được sử dụng ở Huế cho rằng “Năm Thành Thái thứ 9 (1897), chiếc cầu trên được nhà cầm quyền Pháp (khi ấy Khâm xứ Trung Kỳ là Levecque) giao cho hãng Eiffel (Pháp) thiết kế (do Gustave Eiffel thiết kế) và xây dựng lại bằng sắt, đến năm Thành Thái thứ 11 (1899) thì hoàn thành và được mang tên vị vua này.”

Tuy nhiên, các tài liệu của Pháp sau đây cho thấy cây cầu này thực sự được thiết kế và xây dựng bởi Schneider et Letellier (Société Schneider et Cie và Cie de Letellier) và được hoàn thành vào năm 1901:

“Vu le programme et cahier des charges de l’adjudication sur concours, pour la construction d’un pont métallique sur la rivière de Hué, approuvé le 26 mai 1897; Vu le projet déposé par la Société Schneider et Cie et Letellier, représentée par M. Dessoliers, ingénieur à Hanoi…” (Về chương trình và thông số kỹ thuật của cuộc thi đấu thầu xây dựng cầu kim loại bắc qua sông Huế, được phê duyệt ngày 26 tháng 5 năm 1897; Về dự án do Société Schneider et Cie et Letellier, đại diện là ông Dessoliers, kỹ sư tại Hà Nội). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1897-11

“Le pont de Hué: Un concours, basé sur ce programme, fut ouvert, en mai 1897, entre les constructeurs français. Le projet présenté par MM. Schneider et Cie et Letellier fut jugé supérieur à celui des autres concurrents, et le pont fut adjugé le 23 novembre 1897. Le montant des dépenses autorisées fut fixé à 723.926.50 francs.” (Cầu Huế: Một cuộc thi đấu thầu, dựa trên chương trình này, được khai mạc vào tháng 5 năm 1897 giữa các nhà xây dựng Pháp. Dự án do ông Schneider và Letellier trình bày được coi là vượt trội hơn so với các đối thủ cạnh tranh khác, và việc xây dựng cây cầu đã được trao cho công ty của hai ông vào ngày 23 tháng 11 năm 1897. Số tiền được phép chi tiêu đã được ấn định là 723.926,50 francs). Paul Doumer, Situation de l’Indochine française de 1897 à 1901, 1901

“Les sieurs Schneider et Letellier ont reçu, le 18 oct. 1901, notification d’un ordre de service les invitant à se présenter dans les bureaux du premier arrondissement du service des travaux publics à Hanoï pour y prendre connaissance du décompte définitif des travaux du pont de Hué et à le signer pour acceptation” (Vào ngày 18 tháng 10 năm 1901, ông Schneider và Letellier nhận được thông báo về lệnh dịch vụ mời họ đến văn phòng của Sở Công chánh quận thứ nhất ở Hà Nội để để ý xem xét quyết toán cuối cùng về công trình cầu tại Huế và ký nó để chấp nhận). Recueil des arrêts du Conseil d’État, Paris, 1908

Công ty Schneider, ban đầu được thành lập tại Le Creusot (Saône-et-Loire), cũng đã xây dựng nhiều cây cầu kim loại lớn cho các tuyến đường sắt Hà Nội-Vinh và Hải Phòng-Hà Nội-Việt Trì, và sau này sẽ khai sinh ra Công ty Schneider Electric hiện nay.

Bưu điện Sài Gòn

Saigon – L’Hôtel des Postes (Bưu điện Sài Gòn)

Mỗi năm, hàng triệu du khách nước ngoài đến thăm tòa nhà nổi tiếng này được các hướng dẫn viên du lịch thông báo rằng đây là “một tác phẩm của Gustave Eiffel.” Trong khi lịch sử của Bưu điện Sài Gòn ít được ghi chép hơn hai cây cầu nói trên, các nguồn tài liệu hiện có cho thấy rõ ràng Bưu điện Sài Gòn không phải là tác phẩm của Eiffel.

Câu chuyện về  “Bưu điện Eiffel” được cho là xuất phát ban đầu từ tài liệu “Hướng dẫn thuyết minh về các địa điểm tham quan trong thành phố,” được Sở Ngoại vụ Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh lưu hành vào năm 1990 cho tất cả các công ty du lịch và những cơ quan khác có liên hệ với du khách nước ngoài. Tài liệu này bao gồm những lời khuyên sau: “Nhà BĐTP là do kỹ sư Guy-xta-vơ Ép-phen – Pháp – thiết kế và chỉ đạo xây dựng từ năm 1887-1891 thì hoàn thành theo phong cách chiết trung.”

Ngày nay, câu chuyện về “Bưu điện Eiffel” vẫn được truyền cho nhiều hướng dẫn viên du lịch, mặc dù thực tế tất cả các dữ liệu lịch sử hiện có đều chứng minh rằng câu chuyện này là không đúng.

Công ty Eiffel tại Đông Dương

Gustave Eiffel, Ingénieur français (1832-1923), photo de Nadar ©MP/Leemage (Gustave Eiffel, kỹ sư người Pháp (1832-1923), ảnh của Nadar © MP/Leemage)

Theo bài của Laurent Weill, “l’Entreprise Eiffel et la mise en valeur de l’Indochine, 1889-1965,” (Công ty Eiffel và việc đánh giá và phát huy giá trị của Đông Dương, 1889-1965), ban đầu được xuất bản trong tạp chí Histoire, économie & société, năm 1995, 14-2, Công ty Eiffel được thành lập vào năm 1863 bởi ông Gustave Eiffel dưới tên công ty Gustave Eiffel et Cie, vào năm 1872, công ty này đã mở một văn phòng tại Nam Kỳ.

Danh sách chính thức các công trình của Công ty Eiffel do Hiệp hội Hậu duệ của Gustave Eiffel chuẩn bị tại www.gustaveeiffel.com/ cho thấy rằng, trong khi phần lớn các công trình của Eiffel nằm ở Pháp, công ty của ông cũng được ủy thác xây dựng nhiều công trình kiến trúc ở Nam Kỳ từ năm 1872 đến 1889.

Những công trình này bao gồm các cầu đường sắt (cầu Bình Điền, Tân An và Bến Lức trên tuyến đường sắt Sài Gòn-Mỹ Tho), các cầu đường bộ (Cầu Mống tại Sài Gòn, cầu Malabars tại Chợ Lớn, cầu Ông Núi, cầu Rạch Lăng, cầu Bình Tây, cầu Rạch Giá, cầu Long Xuyên), các chợ (chợ Long Châu, chợ Cao Lãnh, chợ Ô Môn, chợ Tân Quy Đông và chợ Tân An), các giếng lọc, và các lối đi bờ kênh/rạch, và trụ sở lớn của Halles des Messageries fluviales trên bờ sông Sài Gòn – xem https://gustaveeiffel.com/ses-oeuvres/asie/

Đến năm 1889, năm Eiffel xây dựng Tháp Eiffel nổi tiếng cho Triển lãm Quốc tế tại Paris, công ty có văn phòng tại các thành phố Sài Gòn, Thượng Hải, Lisbon, Saint Petersburg và Buenos Aires, và các đại diện ở Madrid và Naples. Vào ngày 21 tháng 5 năm 1890, Công ty Établissements Eiffel được thành lập, trong đó Gustave Eiffel kiểm soát hơn 50% thủ đô (tức là 4.643.068 francs).

Tuy nhiên, từ năm 1891 đến 1893, vận may của ông Gustave Eiffel thay đổi đáng kể, khi kế hoạch xây dựng tàu điện ngầm Paris “Projet Eiffel de Métropolitain” của ông bị chính quyền thành phố Paris bác bỏ, và bản thân ông bị dính vào bê bối tài chính và chính trị xung quanh dự án xây dựng kênh đào qua eo đất Panama thất bại của Pháp. Sau khi bị cáo buộc vào tháng 11 năm 1892 liên quan đến vụ bê bối Panama, Eiffel từ chức hội đồng quản trị của công ty Etablissements Eiffel vào ngày 10 tháng 1 năm 1893. Sau đó ông từ chối cho phép công ty tiếp tục mang tên của ông. Vì vậy một hội đồng quản trị mới đã được bổ nhiệm và công ty chính thức thay đổi đặt tên là Société de Constructions de Levallois-Perret (SCLP).

Hiệp hội Hậu duệ của Gustave Eiffel đã chuẩn bị một danh sách đầy đủ tất cả các tác phẩm của Eiffel tại www.gustaveeiffel.com/

Công ty kế thừa của Công ty Etablissements Eiffel, Société Constructions Levallois-Perret tiếp tục đóng một vai trò quan trọng trong sự phát triển của thuộc địa Pháp, xây dựng phần lớn cơ sở hạ tầng cảng Saïgon cũng như một số lượng lớn các cây cầu trên tuyến đường sắt Bắc Nam (Transindochinois). Cuối cùng vào năm 1937, tự tin rằng danh tiếng của người sáng lập không thể bị lung lay bởi những ký ức về vụ bê bối Panama, công ty đổi tên thành Société des Anciens Établissements Eiffel (SAEE) – xem www.entreprises-coloniales.fr/inde-indochine/Eiffel-Indochine.pdf

Mặc dù Công ty Eiffel đã chịu trách nhiệm cho nhiều công trình ở Nam Kỳ, nhưng việc thiết kế hoặc là xây dựng Bưu điện Sài Gòn không được đề cập trong danh sách chính thức các công trình của Eiffel do Hiệp hội Hậu duệ của Gustave Eiffel chuẩn bị – xem https://gustaveeiffel.com/ses-oeuvres/asie/

Rất đáng kể, việc thiết kế hoặc là xây dựng bưu điện bởi công ty Eiffel cũng không được đề cập trong bất kỳ tài liệu thực dân Pháp nào về công ty Eiffel được kho tại Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer (Lưu trữ Quốc gia Hải ngoại) ở Aix-en-Provence, Pháp, tại các Trung tâm Lưu trữ quốc gia Việt Nam, hoặc là trực tuyến tại trang web Gallica https://gallica.bnf.fr/ của Thư viện Quốc gia Pháp.

Một số người cũng cho rằng ngay cả không có bằng chứng cho thấy rằng Công ty Eiffel đã thiết kế hoặc xây dựng Bưu điện Sài Gòn, thì có lẽ công ty của ông đã sản xuất khung sắt của Bưu điện.

Có tài liệu cho biết khung sắt của Bưu điện Sài Gòn được đúc ở Pháp và sau đó chuyển sang Đông Dương:

“Achèvement de l’hôtel des postes et des télégraphes – 40,000 Piastres. Il reste à mettre sur l’hôtel des postes la grande charpente, qui est actuellement en cours de fabrication en France, puis tous les travaux de parachèvement qui ne peuvent être exécutés avant la pose de la charpente. Le crédit de 40,000 piastres sera suffisant pour achever” (Sự hoàn thành Bưu điện – 40.000 Piastres. Vẫn còn chờ đợi vào việc lắp đặt khung lớn của bưu điện, hiện đang được sản xuất tại Pháp; không có việc nào có thể hoàn thiện được trước khi lắp đặt khung. Khoản tín dụng 40.000 piastres sẽ đủ để hoàn thành điều này). Procès-verbaux du Conseil colonial, Saïgon, 1887 

Rót cuộc, không có bằng chứng nào cho thấy Maison Eiffel đã xây dựng khung sắt của Bưu điện Sài Gòn, đặc biệt là vì nó không được đề cập trong danh sách chính thức về các khung tòa nhà bằng kim loại (charpentes) do công ty Eiffel sản xuất, được chuẩn bị bởi Hiệp hội Hậu duệ của Gustave Eiffel – xem https://gustaveeiffel.com/charpentes-metalliques/

Trong cuốn sách Hanoi – Biography of a City (Hà Nội – Tiểu sử của một Thành phố, Sydney, 2000), tác giả William Logan đã mạo hiểm đưa ra ý kiến rằng nỗi ám ảnh của ngành du lịch Việt Nam với ông Gustave Eiffel có thể chỉ là “thêm một huyền thoại khác…. được dự định để củng cố phả hệ về tác động của người Pháp đối với thành phố.”

Sài Gòn vẫn còn một công trình kiến trúc đích thực do công ty Établissements Eiffel xây dựng – cây cầu Pont des Messageries maritimes hay là Cầu Mống (được khánh thành vào năm 1882), được cho là cây cầu Eiffel duy nhất còn sót lại ở châu Á – nhưng rất kỳ là ít công ty du lịch dẫn khách nước ngoài đến tham quan di tích này

Nếu tên của Gustave Eiffel là một điểm thu hút khách du lịch Việt Nam đến, vậy thật khó lý giải tại sao ở Sài Gòn – nơi các hướng dẫn viên du lịch tiếp tục quảng bá huyền thoại sai về “Bưu điện Eiffel” – công trình đích thực duy nhất của Eiffel còn sót lại, cây Cầu Messageries maritimes/Cầu Mống được khánh thành vào năm 1882 – hiếm khi được các đoàn du lịch ghé thăm.

Để biết thêm thông tin về Cầu Messageries maritimes/Cầu Mống, xem www.historicvietnam.com/the-rainbow-bridge-a-true-eiffel-classic/

Ông Marie-Alfred Foulhoux, kiến trúc sư thật sự của Bưu điện Sài Gòn

Chưa có tài liệu hoặc bản vẽ chính thức nào mang tên nhà thiết kế hay nhà xây dựng Bưu điện Sài Gòn được tìm thấy, nhưng hai bài báo cùng thời – Le Temps (Paris), ngày 28 tháng 2 năm 1888, và L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architecture et artistique (Kiến trúc sư-người xây dựng: đánh giá thế giới kiến trúc và nghệ thuật) số 25, ngày 15 tháng 9 năm 1891 – đều mô tả rõ rằng Bưu điện Sài Gòn là công trình của kiến trúc sư trưởng Nam Kỳ, Marie-Alfred Foulhoux:

Le Temps (Paris), 28 Février 1888

“Saïgon a aussi ses monuments, son palais gouvernemental, datant de l’époque de l’amiral La Grandière; sa cathédrale et son palais de Justice, œuvres de l’architecte Foulhoux, un ancien de Cochinchine qui est toujours sur la brèche. M. Foulhoux construit actuellement un superbe hôtel des postes, dont les travaux sont menés avec une rapidité plus grande que celle de l’hôtel de la rue Jean-Jacques-Rousseau” (Sài Gòn còn có các di tích, dinh thự có từ thời Đô đốc La Grandière; nhà thờ lớn và tòa án của nó, các tác phẩm của kiến trúc sư Foulhoux, một người đã sống lâu tại Nam Kỳ, người luôn luôn rất bận rộn. Foulhoux hiện đang xây dựng một bưu điện tuyệt vời, công trình này sẽ được thực hiện với tốc độ nhanh hơn so với công trình xây dựng khách sạn trên đường Jean-Jacques-Rousseau). Le Temps (Paris), 1888-02-28

L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architectural et artistique No 25, 15 Septembre 1891

“L’inauguratiou du nouvel hôtel des postes de Saigon qui devait avoir lieu le 14 juillet dernier a été remise au retour du gouverneur général. Ce monument, orné d’une façade des plus artistiques est particulièrement bien aménagé et bien compris pour les différents services auxquels il est destiné; il fait le plus grand honneur à l’habileté et au talent du distingué architecte en chef delà colonie, M. Foulhoux. Nos lecteurs n’ont pas oublié notre excellent ami qui a été le commissaire délégué de l’Indo Chine à l’Exposition de 1889 et auquel nous avons dû le magnifique palais des colonies construit en teck rouge de l’Indo-Chine” (Việc khánh thành bưu điện mới ở Sài Gòn sẽ diễn ra vào ngày 14 tháng 7, đã bị hoãn lại cho đến khi Toàn quyền Đông Dương trở lại. Đài tưởng niệm, được trang trí với mặt tiền rất nghệ thuật, đặc biệt được trang bị tốt cho các dịch vụ khác đã dự định; công trình này tôn vinh các kỹ năng và tài năng của kiến trúc sư trưởng xuất sắc của thuộc địa, M Foulhoux. Độc giả của chúng tôi vẫn chưa quên người bạn xuất sắc của chúng tôi, người từng là phó ủy viên Đông Dương tại Triển lãm 1889, và người mà khiến chúng tôi mang ơn cung điện thuộc địa tráng lệ, được xây bằng gỗ lim Đông Dương). L’Architecte constructeur: revue du monde architectural et artistique, Paris, 1891-09-15

Ông Henri Vildieu có tham gia thiết kế Bưu điện Sài Gòn hay không?

Cuốn sách Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme (Nhà Xuất Bản Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh), được xuất bản vào năm 1998, vẫn cung cấp một trong những cái nhìn tổng quan hay nhất về các di tích lịch sử quan trọng tại Sài Gòn

Cuốn sách Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme (Nhà Xuất Bản Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh), được xuất bản vào năm 1998, cho rằng Bưu điện Sài Gòn “construite sur les plans de l’architecte Vildieu, Chef du Service des Batiments civils du Tonkin, avec l’aide de Foulhoux” (được xây dựng theo kế hoạch của kiến trúc sư Vildieu, Trưởng ban Công cộng ở Bắc Kỳ, với sự hỗ trợ của Foulhoux). Trong những năm kể từ khi cuốn sách này được xuất bản, tuyên bố này đã được nhắc lại trong rất nhiều sách và bài khác.

Tuy nhiên, không có bằng chứng nào chứng minh cho ý kiến cho rằng ông Foulhoux, lúc đó là một nhân vật cấp cao trong chính quyền Nam Kỳ, đã là phụ tá cho ông Vildieu, lúc đó là người tương đối trẻ chỉ giữ chức vụ phó kiến trúc. Cũng không có bằng chứng nào cho thấy rằng ông Vildieu đã tham gia vào việc thiết kế hoặc xây dựng Bưu điện Sài Gòn.

Nếu chúng ta tìm kiếm các ấn phẩm chính thức của chính phủ Đông Dương trên Gallica, chúng ta có thể thấy rằng Marie-Alfred Foulhoux (1840-1892) đến Nam Kỳ năm 1869 và trở thành Chef du Service des Bâtiments Civiles en Cochinchine (Giám đốc các Công trình Cộng đồng) năm 1872. Ông đã được bổ nhiệm làm Kiến trúc sư trưởng vào năm 1879.

“FOULHOUX ALFRED, architecte en chef de l’Indo-Chine (Nécrologie) – La Construction moderne lui a consacré la notice suivante due à M. Charles Lucas: Mercredi 20 janvier (1892), est décédé subitement à Saigon (Cochinchine), M. Foulhoux, architecte, qui depuis vingt-cinq années habitait cette colonie, et avait été, en 1872, après la démission de M. Monnier, nommé par le ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, chef de la section des bâtiments civils du service des travaux d’architecture de la Cochinchine. C’est en cette qualité que M. Foulhoux avait tracé le plan de la ce partie neuve de la ville de Saigon, et fait élever le palais du gouverneur général, ainsi que plusieurs autres édifices publics tant à Saïgon que dans les autres villes de l’Indo-Chine française” (FOULHOUX ALFRED, Kiến trúc sư trưởng của Đông Dương (Obituary) – La Construction moderne (Tạp chí xây dựng hiện đại đã gửi thông báo sau đây của ông Charles Lucas: Vào thứ Tư ngày 20 tháng 1 (1892), ông Foulhoux, kiến trúc sư, đột ngột qua đời tại Sài Gòn (Nam Kỳ). ông ấy đã sống 25 năm tại thuộc địa này, và sau khi ông Monnier từ chức vào năm 1872, ông được Bộ trưởng Bộ Hải quân và Thuộc địa bổ nhiệm làm Giám đốc Ông Vildieu, kiến trúc sư, Giám đốc các Công trình Cộng đồng của Sở Công chính và Kiến trúc của Nam Kỳ. Trong khi giữ chức vụ này, ông Foulhoux đã vạch ra quy hoạch cho phần mới này của thành phố Sài Gòn, và cho dựng dinh Toàn quyền, cũng như một số công trình công cộng khác ở cả Sài Gòn và các thành phố khác của Đông Dương Pháp). Société des architectes de l’Anjou, Angers, 1892

Các tài liệu cho thấy rằng ông Foulhoux cũng chịu trách nhiệm cho bốn công trình cộng đồng khác ở Sài Gòn, Bưu điện Sài Gòn là công trình cuối cùng của ông:

– Secrétariat général du gouvernement (Dinh Thượng thơ, 1881)
– Palais de Justice (Tòa án nhân dân, 1885)
– Hôtel des douanes (Cục Hải quan, 1887)
– Palais du Lieutenant-gouverneur de Cochinchine (Dinh Gia Long, 1890)
– Hôtel des postes (Bưu điện Sài Gòn, 1891)

Trong khi đó, chỉ đến tháng 2 năm 1885 là ông Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) được bổ nhiệm làm phó kiến trúc sư cho chính quyền Đông Dương:

Vào năm 1885 ông Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) bắt đầu phục vụ thuộc địa Pháp ở Hà Nội và trở thành kiến trúc sư hạng 2 của Service des bâtiments Civils (Cục Công trình Cộng đồng) vào năm 1895

“Architectes chefs de service du 2e classe: Vildieu, Auguste-Henri; Date de naissance – 6 sept 1847; Date de la dernière nomination – 14 juil 1895; Date d’entrée dans l’administration locale – 25 fév 1885” (Vildieu, Auguste-Henri; Ngày sinh – ngày 6 tháng 9 năm 1847; Ngày đề cử cuối cùng – ngày 14 tháng 7 năm 1895; Ngày gia nhập chính quyền địa phương – ngày 25 tháng 2 năm 1885). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1902

Chỉ đến năm 1895, ông Vildieu trở thành Chef du service des bâtiments Civils (Giám đốc các Công trình Cộng đồng), 3 năm sau cái chết của ông Foulhoux:

“M Vildieu, architecte, chef du service des bâtiments civils, Président” (Ông Vildieu, kiến trúc sư, Cục trưởng, Cục Công trình Cộng đồng, Chủ tịch). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1895

Cho đến cuối tháng 7 năm 1902, hơn một thập kỷ sau cái chết của Foulhoux, ông Vildieu vẫn là “architecte-adjoint” (phó kiến trúc sư) và “Architecte chef de service de 2e classe” (kiến trúc sư, cục trưởng hạng 2):

“Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architect-adjoint” (Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), phó kiến trúc sư phụ). Les Tablettes coloniales: organe des possessions françaises d’Outre-mer, Paris, 1888-08-29

“Architectes chefs de service du 2e classe: Vildieu (Auguste-Henri); Date de naissance – 6 sept 1847; Date de la dernière nomination – 14 juil 1895; Date d’entrée dans l’administration locale – 25 fév 1885” (Các kiến trúc sư, cục trưởng của hạng 2 (Vildieu (Auguste-Henri); Ngày sinh – ngày 6 tháng 9 năm 1847; Ngày đề cử cuối cùng – ngày 14 tháng 7 năm 1895; Ngày vào chính quyền địa phương – ngày 25 tháng 2 năm 1885). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hà Nội, 1902). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1902

Cuối cùng, vào ngày 19 tháng 7 năm 1902, ông Vildieu được thăng chức thành “Architecte 1re classe” (Kiến trúc sư hạng 1) và Architecte-en-chef des Travaux publics de l’Indochine (Kiến trúc sư trưởng của Sở Công chính Đông Dương)

Vào năm 1902, ông Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926) trở thành Kiến trúc sư hạng 1 và Kiến trúc sư trưởng của Sở Công chính Đông Dương; sau khi nghỉ hưu vào năm 1912, ông được phong làm Kiến trúc sư trưởng danh dự

“Par arrêté du Gouverneur général de l’Indo-Chine p. i., en date du 19 juillet 1902, rendu sur la proposition du Directeur général des Travaux publics: Sont promus dans le personnel des Travaux publics de l’Indo-Chine: 2° au grade d’architecte de 1re classe: M. Vildieu, Auguste, architecte de 2e classe” (Theo nghị định của Quyền Toàn quyền Đông Dương, ngày 19 tháng 7 năm 1902, theo đề nghị của Tổng Giám đốc Công chính: Các nhân viên sau của Sở Công chính Đông Dương được thăng cấp kiến trúc sư hạng 1: Ông Vildieu, Auguste, Kiến trúc sư hạng 2). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1902-07

“Vildieu, Auguste: Date de la nomination au grade de Architecte-principal, chef du service: 19 juillet 1902” (Vildieu, Auguste: Ngày được bổ nhiệm vào ngạch Kiến trúc sư trưởng, Cục trưởng: ngày 19 tháng 7 năm 1902). Annuaire général de l’Indo-Chine, Hanoi, 1925

Các công trình được cho là của Vildieu đều nằm ở Hà Nội, và tất cả đều có niên đại từ cuối những năm 1890 đến 1906, một thời gian sau khi Foulhoux qua đời:

– Maison centrale (Nhà tù Hỏa Lò, 1899)
– Gare de Hanoi (Ga Hà Nội, 1902)
– Travaux publics de l’Indochine (Sở Công chính Đông Dương, 1902)
– Hôtel des postes (Bưu điện Hà Nội, 1905)
– Palais de Justice (Tòa án Nhân dân, 1906)
– Mairie de Hanoi (Tòa thị chính Hà Nội, 1906)
– Palais du Gouverneur Général à Hanoi (Phủ Chủ tịch Hà Nội, 1906)

Điều này càng khiến chúng ta khó tin rằng Vildieu có thể là kiến trúc sư chính của một tòa nhà lớn ở Sài Gòn đã được hoàn thành trước đó gần một thập kỷ, khi ông Vildieu vẫn còn là một phó kiến trúc.

Sau khi ông Vildieu nghỉ hưu vào năm 1912, ông được phong làm Architecte-en-chef honoraire (Kiến trúc sư trưởng danh dự) của Sở Công chính Đông Dương:

“Par arrêtés du Gouverneur général de l’Indochine du 12 décembre 1912: Sont nommés, à compter du jour de leur radiation des cadres de l’activité, professeurs stagiaires dans le personnel français de l’Enseignement dans les pays de Protectorat de l’Indochine, pour servir en Annam: 1° Architecte en chef honoraire des Travaux publics de l’Indochine: M. Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architecte principal chef de service” (Theo sắc lệnh của Toàn quyền Đông Dương ngày 12 tháng 12 năm 1912: Những người sau đây được bổ nhiệm, kể từ ngày nghỉ hưu, làm giáo viên tập sự trong đội ngũ giảng dạy tiếng Pháp ở các nước thuộc Chính quyền Bảo hộ Đông Dương, để làm việc tại An Nam: 1° Kiến trúc sư trưởng danh dự của Sở Công chính Đông Dương: Ông Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), kiến trúc sư trưởng, Cục trưởng), chief architect, head of department). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1912

Khi so sánh các mốc thời gian trong sự nghiệp của hai người đàn ông này, chúng ta có thể thấy rõ ràng rằng, vào thời điểm ông Vildieu được cho là “kiến trúc sư chính của Bưu điện Sài Gòn” và ông Foulhoux từng là “trợ lý của Vildieu,” ngược lại ông Foulhoux là Kiến trúc sư trưởng của Nam Kỳ, trong khi ông Vildieu chỉ là phó kiến trúc sư hạng 2 thôi. Vildieu chỉ trở thành Chef du service des bâtiments Civils en Annam et au Tonkin (Cục trưởng, Cục Công trình Cộng đồng tại Annam và Tonkin) vào năm 1893, và cuối cùng là Kiến trúc sư hạng 1 vào năm 1902, rất lâu sau khi ông Foulhoux qua đời.

Như vậy, vào thời điểm của dự án Bưu điện Sài Gòn, Kiến trúc sư trưởng Foulhoux rõ ràng là đàn anh của hai ông này, cả về tuổi đời lẫn quyền hạn, vì thế không có cách nào mà ông Foulhoux là trợ lý của ông Vildieu.

Trên thực tế, các ông Foulhoux và Vildieu đã làm việc cùng với nhau trong việc xây dựng các cung điện cho Universal Exposition (Triển lãm Quốc tế) năm 1889 tại Paris, và sau đó Vildieu cũng làm việc ở Nam Kỳ trong giai đoạn 1892-1893:

Vue générale de l’exposition universelle de 1889

The Universal Exposition of 1889 project was organised “sous la direction de M. Louis Menrique, commissaire spécial de l’exposition coloniale, par MM. Sauvestre, architecte en chef des colonies françaises; Foulhoux, architecte en chef de l’Indo-Chine; Fabre, architecte du Cambodge; Vildieu, architecte du Tonkin; de Brossard, architecte adjoint, et Martin, inspecteur des bâtiments” (Dự án Universal Exposition (Triển lãm Quốc tế) năm 1889 được tổ chức dưới sự chỉ đạo của ông Louis Henrique, Ủy viên đặc biệt của Triển lãm Quốc tế, bởi các ông Sauvestre, Kiến trúc sư trưởng các Thuộc địa Pháp, Foulhoux, Kiến trúc sư trưởng của Đông Dương, Fabre, Kiến trúc sư của Campuchia, Vildieu, Kiến trúc sư của Tonkin, Brossard, Kiến trúc sư, và Martin, Thanh tra các tòa nhà). Alfred Picard, Exposition universelle internationale de 1889 à Paris: rapport général par M. Alfred Picard. Travaux de l’Exposition, Paris, 1891-1892

Tuy nhiên, tất cả các tài liệu mô tả sự hợp tác này ở Paris đều nói rằng ông Foulhoux là người phụ trách, trong khi ông Vildieu (cùng với đồng nghiệp của anh ấy là ông Fabre) chỉ là “kiến trúc sư” – nói cách khác, ông Vildieu phải là trợ lý của Foulhoux, chứ không phải là ngược lại.

“Ces palais ont été construits par M. Foulhoux, architecte du gouvernement de la Cochinchine, et par MM. Fabre et Vildieu, ses adjoints, avec un respect de la vérité locale, une sagacité dans le choix des types, un amour des arts qu’ils voulaient reproduire et une sincérité de sentiment qui en font les plus authentiques des curiosités et les plus intéressantes des merveilles” (Các cung điện này được xây dựng bởi ông Foulhoux, Kiến trúc sư của chính quyền Nam Kỳ, và các ông Fabre và Vildieu, những người phụ tá của ông, với sự tôn trọng tính xác thực địa phương, sự khôn ngoan trong việc lựa chọn kiểu xây dựng, tình yêu nghệ thuật mà họ muốn tái tạo, và sự chân thành của tình cảm khiến các cung điện này trở nên chân thực nhất trong những điều tò mò và điều thú vị nhất của những điều kỳ diệu). Le Temps (Paris), 1889-05-04

“MM. Foulhoux, architecte en chef, et Vildieu, architecte adjoint, ont habilement dirigé les études et travaux de cette construction et de son aménagement intérieur.” (Các ông Foulhoux, kiến trúc sư trưởng, và Vildieu, phó kiến trúc sư, đã chỉ đạo một cách khéo léo các nghiên cứu và công việc của công trình xây dựng này và các phụ kiện nội thất của nó). Le Génie civil: revue générale des industries françaises et étrangères, Paris, 1889-03-09

Sau sự hợp tác này, vào năm 1892-1893, ông Vildieu cũng đã làm việc tại văn phòng Sở Công chính Nam Ký tại Sài Gòn với tư cách là Phó Kiến trúc sư trong Cục Di tích Thành phố:

COCHINCHINE FRANCAISE – SAIGON – Service des travaux publics: Rampant, architecte, chef du service; Foulhoux, architecte, chef de la section des bâtiments civils; Thil architecte, sous-inspecteur des bâtiments civils; Kerrien, chef de la section des ponts et chaussées; Vildieu, architecte adjoint au service des monuments civils (NAM KỲ PHÁP – SÀI GÒN – Sở Công chính: Rampant, Kiến trúc sư, Giám đốc; Foulhoux, Kiến trúc sư, Cục trưởng Công trình Cộng đồng; Thil, Kiến trúc sư, Thanh tra Công trình Cộng đồng; Kerrien, Cục trưởng Cầu đường; Vildieu, Phó Kiến trúc sư Cục Di tích Thành phố). Indicateur de la propriété foncière dans Paris et le département de la Seine, Paris, 1892

Ông Foulhoux đột ngột qua đời vào ngày 20 tháng 1 năm 1892, trong khi Vildieu vẫn đang làm việc tại Sài Gòn.

Khi Vildieu được bổ nhiệm làm Cục trưởng, Cục Công trình Cộng đồng tại Annam và Tonkin vào ngày 15 tháng 6 năm 1893, ông không còn là nhân viên của Sở Công chính Nam Kỳ:

“15 juin 1893. – Gouverneur général de l’Indo-Chine: M. Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), architecte adjoint, est nommé architecte, Chef du service des bâtiments civils en Annam et au Tonkin, et cessera à partir de la date du présent arrêté de faire partie du personnel du service des bâtiments civils de la Cochinchine” (Ngày 15 tháng 6 năm 1893 – Toàn quyền Đông Dương: Ông Vildieu (Auguste-Henri), Phó kiến trúc sư, được bổ nhiệm làm Chef du service des Bâtiments Civils en Annam et au Tonkin (Cục trưởng, Cục Công trình Cộng đồng tại Annam và Tonkin), và ngày có nghị định này sẽ không còn là nhân viên của cơ quan dân sự Nam Kỳ). Bulletin officiel de l’Indochine française, Saïgon et Hanoï, 1893-06

Ngoại trừ Universal Exposition (Triển lãm Quốc tế) năm 1889, không có bằng chứng về bất kỳ sự hợp tác kiến trúc nào khác giữa hai người đàn ông trước khi ông Foulhoux qua đời. Do đó, chúng ta có thể kết luận rằng ông Vildieu không tham gia việc thiết kế hoặc là xây dựng Bưu điện Sài Gòn.

Tác giả viết bài này đã tham khảo ý kiến của bốn người biên tập ấn phẩm nói trên, Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme – TS Natasha Pairaudeau, TS François Tainturier, TS Philippe Peycam và Nhà đô thị học Chu Quang Tôn liên quan đến tuyên bố của họ rằng ông Vildieu là kiến trúc sư chính của Bưu điện Sài Gòn. Tuy nhiên, vì tác phẩm này đã được xuất bản cách đây hơn 20 năm, không ai trong số họ có thể nhớ lại cơ sở mà cuốn sách của họ đã trích dẫn Vildieu là kiến trúc sư chính của Bưu điện Sài Gòn và Foulhoux là trợ lý.

Tuy nhiên, họ đề cập rằng vào năm 1998, khi nghiên cứu sách này, họ không truy cập được tài liệu trong các Lưu trữ Quốc gia Pháp và Việt Nam, va và bởi vì lúc đó cũng không có mạng Internet và trang web Gallica, họ phụ thuộc chủ yếu các tài liệu trong Thư viện Khoa học Tổng hợp Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh và Thư viện Quốc gia Hà Nội.

Tonkin – Hà Nội – Palais de Justice et Prisons, một công trình của Auguste-Henri Vildieu (1847-1926)

Vì không thể chứng minh được sự hợp tác nào khác giữa ông Foulhoux và Vildieu, và vào thời điểm nghiên cứu sách, họ không thể truy cập được các tài liệu bổ sung được trích dẫn ở trên, các biên tập viên của sách Saïgon 1698-1998 Kiến Trúc/Architectures Quy Hoạch/Urbanisme chấp nhận rằng tuyên bố của họ về sự tham gia của Vildieu trong dự án Bưu điện Sài Gòn là không chính xác.

Đính chính lại sự hiểu lầm về Gustave Eiffel

Ngày nay, Việt Nam không còn chỉ là một điểm đến phiêu lưu nữa. Nó đã bắt đầu thu hút một lượng khách du lịch quan tâm đến văn hóa và di sản, bao gồm cả những du khách lớn tuổi, giàu có hơn, những người này thường thường ở lại lâu hơn, tham gia nhiều hoạt động văn hóa hơn và chi tiêu nhiều tiền hơn. Những du khách như vậy mong đợi và xứng đáng được cung cấp thông tin lịch sử chính xác về di sản Việt Nam, hơn là những câu chuyện huyền thoại.

Tác già hy vọng rằng bản tóm tắt ngắn gọn này về dữ liệu lịch sử liên quan đến cầu Long Biên ở Hà Nội, cầu Trường Tiền ở Huế và Bưu điện Sài Gòn sẽ giúp giải quyết bất kỳ hoài nghi còn tồn tại.

Tác giả xin chân thành cảm ơn ông Emmanuel Cerise, TS Natasha Pairaudeau, TS François Tainturier, TS Philippe Peycam và Nhà đô thị học Chu Quang Tôn đã hỗ trợ việc nghiên cứu bài này.

Tim Doling là tác giả của các sách Exploring Huế (Khám phá Huế, Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Sài Gòn-Chợ Lớn (Khám phá Sài Gòn-Chợ Lớn, Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019), Exploring Quảng Nam (Khám phá Quảng Nam, Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới , Hà Nội, 2020) và The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (Đường sắt và các Xe tramway của Việt Nam, White Lotus Press, 2012)

Một chỉ mục đầy đủ của tất cả các bài viết trên blog Historicvietnam.com của Tim kể từ tháng 11 năm 2013 hiện có sẵn tại đây.

Tonkin, 1890s – Vue d’un train chargé de passagers, œuvre de François-Henri Schneider, showing a 0.6m gauge Decauville 0-4-4-0 (0220) “Mallet”

Translated from “L’Experience Tonkinoise: le Chemin de fer Phu Lang Thuong à Lang Son” by J P Vergez Larrouy, Chemins de fer regionaux et urbains, No 239, 1993-IV

Tonkin became a French protectorate in 1884; in the same year, the first railway projects saw the light of day. It seems that the first appearance of rail in northern Indochina dates back to 22 August 1885, when a small horse-drawn tramway was inaugurated, linking the French concession in Hà Nội with the Citadel. The “pacification” then experienced some difficulties in Tonkin, more particularly on the side of the border of Guangxi where the Pavillons Noirs and the forces of Đề-Thám put Galliéni’s troops to the test. The mountainous topography of the country posed many problems for the evacuation of sick and wounded, and for the provisioning of certain garrison posts like Lạng Sơn or Cao Bằng. All these factors would lead the soldiers to lobby the authorities for the creation of a railway line to supply the border posts.

Résident Supérieur Paul Bert, thinking big, wanted to establish a vast network of railways in Tonkin. On 18 March 1887, a technical commission for the Tonkin railways was created; its composition was as follows: Edmond Fuchs, Chief Mining Engineer, representing the Ministry of Finance; Captain de Cuverville, representing the Minister of the Colonies; Lax, Chief Engineer of Roads and Bridges; the Director of Railways, representing the Public Works Department; Marie, the Director of Foreign Trade, representing the Minister of War; and Getteb, Engineer of Roads and Bridges, who acted as secretary

The Commission defined a network project, which was entered in the Official Journal of 29 August 1887 and envisaged the creation of three lines:

– Hà Nội to the sea
– Hà Nội to the Chinese border through the Red River Valley
– Bắc Ninh to Lạng Sơn

Having defined the network to be built, they hastened to forget it; Indochina was far away, and for metropolitan parliamentarians, it could prove to be dangerous; everyone remembered the fall of Minister Ferry, brought about by the famous “retreat” from Lạng Sơn. Disappointed by having to wait, the soldiers applied pressure; the line heading towards the Guangxi border was in their eyes most important: “The circumstances which motivate the creation of a Phủ Lạng Thương-Lạng Sơn railway line are both political and economic; they have as their starting point the absolute obligation to provide military supplies to Lạng Sơn, which currently involves an annual expenditure of one million francs.” It seems that the prospect of making some savings won the decision of the Minister, who gave his support to the military. Teams immediately set off to reconnoitre the possible route, but these studies proved rather sketchy. Many people were interested in the line, and several applications for concessions were made. The affair seemed well started when – one does not really know why – the Minister of the Colonies suddenly decided that the line would be built with a track gauge of 0.60m, and that all the rolling stock and other equipment would be provided by the Maison Decauville. This decision was far from a unanimous one, especially among the colonials. The Minister nonetheless stuck by his decision, and work began in 1890. Given the restrictions in crossing the region by the general insecurity and by the carelessness of the successful tenderer, these works took much longer than expected. Inaugurated at the end of 1894, the line would give not very satisfactory results, and would quickly be transformed into a metric track.

Route of the Phủ Lạng Thương-Lạng Sơn line and the Hà Nội-Phủ Lạng Thương and Lạng Sơn-Đồng Đăng extensions, in the context of links with China; this route is therefore that of the line after its conversion to metric gauge from 1896 to 1902

1 The first concession requests and the study of the route

Various private companies were interested in the Lạng Sơn railway; applications for the concession of the line were filed in 1884, 1887 and 1888. The best studied project was that of Thomas, dated November 1887. Taking into the account the possibility of further extensions to Đồng Đăng, Thất Khê, Cao Bằng, and possibly Thái Nguyên, it provided for the construction of a road 4m wide, with the railway installed on it, at a distance of 30cm from the edge. The start of works was scheduled for 30 June 1888, and the project was to be completed by 31 March 1889. Engineer Fuchs was responsible for carrying out a synthesis of the various projects presented. At the same time, the Tonkin Public Works Department was requested to carry out a new study of the route, and it immediately set to work.

From Kép, several variants were retained, but the bad weather caused significant delays in the progress of the works. The most difficult problem, however, was finding labour; in his report to the Résident Général in Annam-Tonkin of 18 May 1888, the Consulting Engineer of the Protectorate admitted: “It is very difficult to find workers, despite the small task imposed on them and the high salary reserved for them. No worker in the delta wants to go beyond Phủ Lạng Thương and if, by known means, they are forced to go further, they take advantage of all circumstances to leave, even giving up their wages.” Out of 10 Chinese labourers sent by the Resident of Lạng Sơn on 24 April 1888, eight had already abandoned the site on the 30 April, after being paid. Despite everything, the work progressed. It was decided to build Lạng Sơn station at the entrance to the town, in order to defend it more easily against a possible Chinese invasion.

Once the study was completed, a report was submitted to Parreau, Résident Général in Annam-Tonkin. The latter transmitted the report to his superior, not without noting: “It will be easy for you, Governor General, to appreciate the usefulness of the future line from Phủ Lạng Thương to Lạng Sơn, from a political and as much as from an economic and commercial point of view. ” Governor General Richaud in turn sent the file to the office of the Minister of the Colonies on 19 October 1888. According to the terms of the report, the line from Phủ Lạng Thương to Lạng Sơn was no more than a simple section of a future Hà Nội-Lạng Sơn line, itself entering into the more general framework of a vast program known as “Tonkin’s railways;” it was planned to establish the line on the “Route Mandarine,” and the expenditure for the construction of the line was estimated at 8,561,066 francs. The author of the report proposed that the concession be awarded to a private company which would then build and operate the line.

The Indochina administration followed the advice of the Public Works Department, and started searching for a concessionaire. Negotiations were opened with the Marquis de Mores, who had declared himself interested; they were on the verge of coming to an agreement when everything changed: “At the moment when an agreement relating to the railway was going to be signed between the Governor General and the Marquis de Mores, an order arrived from the Minister to agree nothing without submitting the project for his approval. Consequently, the Marquis returned to France with his engineer and the studies were interrupted. Even if the affair did not drag too much in Paris, this caused a delay of at least a year (Saigon Republicain, 8 May 1889). Why this sudden turnaround? Would the railway be abandoned once again?

2 The Minister’s choice and colonial objections

2.1 A questionable choice

“Chemin de fer de Phu-Lang-Thuong à Lang-Son (travail de la voie),” Pierre Nicolas, Notices sur l’Indo-Chine, Cochinchine, Cambodge, Annam, Tonkin, Laos, Kouang-Tchéou-Ouan, 1900

Having more or less studied the file, the Minister of the Colonies asked the Governor General of Indochina whether the Public Works Department of Tonkin had the necessary means to establish a Decauville railway line along the Route Mandarine (Colonies to Governor General, Telegram No 728 of 11 April 1889). The least we can say is that the prospect of a Decauville line was given a rather chilly reception in Indochina. Having taken advice from his Director of Public Works, the Governor General sent this rather unfavourable response: “The road from Phủ Lạng Thương to Lạng Sơn does not actually exist. It’s little more than a simple track. The Director of Public Works considers that in these conditions, the establishment of a Decauville line for which the infrastructure would have to be fully executed would constitute the most expensive solution; it would be better to stick to a regular railway of 1m gauge, if sufficient resources are available.” In addition, the Indochina Public Works Department did not have any material available to build a railway. On 16 April 1889, the Minister of the Colonies telegraphed to the Governor General: “Have a firm proposal for Decauville. Would cost about two and a half million, rolling stock included. Decauville would be paid in two and a half years, and budget would not have to support the operation of the line valued at 150,000 francs per year. ”

It appears that the Governor General, complying with the Minister’s directives, gave orders for the establishment of a railway. However, all the answers he received were unfavourable. The Colony’s Director of Public Works, together with Engineer of Roads and Bridges Lion, pointed out that “a Decauville railway between Phủ Lạng Thương and Lạng Sơn, over a length of 108km, is too basic and too delicate a means of transport to abandon the idea of also constructing a good parallel road.” He added that “The expense will be much greater than it seems.” Full of common sense, he finally noted: “By proceeding to an adjudication, we could have 0.60 gauge track and rolling stock at least as good as that of Decauville, and under much more economical conditions.” The Commissaire general raised objections of a geological nature: “Land between Phủ Lạng Thương and Lạng Sơn consists of shale clay …. On such land, installing a Decauville line would be expensive, precarious, and would only be sufficient for transport with a parallel road… building such a Decauville line won’t be finished anytime soon.” (Telegram of 17 April 1889). In response to a request for studies from the Résident Supérieur, Engineer Lion rightly pointed out that there were no studies for this line, “except for that of the 1m gauge railway, made formerly under the direction of Monsieur Fauquier.” Even General Bichot, expressing the views of the military, said that he had not hesitated to telegraph the Governor General the fact that he had “little confidence in Decauville.” The credit of 400,000 francs intended for the preparation work also seemed to him “absolutely derisory,” he estimated the cost of the operation to be “at least 15 million francs.” However, the Minister of the Colonies persisted, developing a rather strange argument. He declared that he did not understand why, having requested a 1m gauge railway, the Governor General now rejected a Decauville line “which will be built in 10 months and will also give time to carry out complete studies on the railway network to be established in Tonkin.” The Minister argued that if the subsequent creation of a railway line from Hà Nội to Lạng Sơn was decided, the Decauville line could still be extended between Lạng Sơn and Cao Bằng; moreover, the Decauville line would make it possible to ensure permanently “the supply of Lạng Sơn and the comfortable transportation of the sick, food and troops” (Telegram of 22 April 1889).

“Tranchée du chemin de fer de la frontiere de Chine” (Cutting on the railway at the Chinese frontier), from Pierre Nicolas, Notices sur l’Indo-Chine, Cochinchine, Cambodge, Annam, Tonkin, Laos, Kouang-Tchéou-Ouan, 1900

What a curious theory! Let’s go in the same direction as Engineer Lion and recognise that a railway of 1m gauge, even a simple road, would bring the same result! If it was planned later to build the line from Hà Nội to Lạng Sơn of 1m gauge, it is difficult to see what value the initial construction of a 0.6m line could bring! In addition, if the main line from Hà Nội would be of 1m gauge but the Lạng Sơn-Cao Bằng line remained a Decauville line, the only result would be to create a break-of-gauge problem in Lạng Sơn, hence a loss of time and an unnecessary increase in operating costs. Let us note in passing that, once the Hà Nội-Lạng Sơn line had been transformed into a 1m gauge track, the Decauville would never be built between Lạng Sơn and Cao Bằng, leaving in place only the famous RC4.

2 Why did the Minister impose the Decauville system?

How to explain the stubbornness of the Minister of the Colonies in this affair? The 0.6m line was developed after the defeat of 1870, and the military were the main users; Colonel Prosper Péchot (1849-1928) had made himself the champion of the system, which was beginning to be used widely in mines or plantations overseas. The publicity of the Corbeil firm focused on its economy and on the lightweight features of the track. But that lightness of track had brought some setbacks for Decauville; a first experiment had been attempted in 1882 in Tunisia, between Sousse and Kairaouan. Very quickly, it was noticed that “the sleepers, riveted but leveled to the right of the running edge of the rail, left the track insufficiently anchored, with a tendency to move with the passage of heavy loads.” The operation of this line quickly turned out to be disastrous, and faced with the impossibility of running locomotives there, they had to be satisfied with horse-drawn traction. So, an initial “colonial” experiment had been attempted using Decauville material, and it had been a failure. The Sousse-Kairouan line would be taken over by the Bône-Guelma in 1887 and reopened to the public, after transformation of the track, on 1 January 1889.

In Tonkin, we can say that the Minister “imposed” the Decauville system; to explain this choice, we are reduced to simple assumptions. Certainly, one can consider that Decauville had secured a “big advertising coup” by supplying the service railway at the Universal Exhibition of Paris in 1889. It is precisely in this connection that we discover the first surprising fact: The Minister gave the order to begin the works of infrastructure in Indochina on 24 April 1889. On this date, there was not yet any question of purchasing material, nor even of awarding a concession. However, when the Universal Exhibition in Paris was inaugurated by Sadi Carnot on 5 May 1889, the locomotives running on the exhibition railway were all “named after the main installations of the Decauville railway,” and significantly the Exhibition’s guestbook recalls that “one of these machines was named Hanoi,” a name which “relates to the small railways of Tonkin.”

“Une tranchée près de Kép,” Le premier chemin de fer du Tonkin, l’Illustration, 4-2-1893, Vol 101, No 2606

However, if we exclude the mythical tramway in the Hà Nội Citadel, there was at that time no railway in Tonkin. The works of the Lạng Sơn railway would not be awarded until September 1889, more than five months after the start of the Exhibition; Decauville was of course on the Minister’s side!

For his part, the Minister of the Colonies was careful to point out that “the proposed railway is not the one used in Tonkin with the Péchot metal sleepers.” The omnipresence of the “sirens” of Decauville around the Minister seems undeniable; Coincidentally, all third-party companies  brought in to bid for the Lạng Sơn railway supply would be those highly recommended by Decauville. For example, the Baillehache company, which would attempt, in 1892, to secure the adoption of its “electrical warnings and protection signals for railway tracks.”

One can also think that the “metropolitan military lobby” also played some role in the choice of the Minister, since the military recommended for Indochina a railway of easy construction and simple operation. In his telegram of 24 April, the Minister of the Colonies admitted having made his decision after favourable consultation with Generals Mensier and Begin, who had affirmed to him “the usefulness of the Decauville system.” When Lion received the order to begin work (letter of 26 April 1889), he immediately asked for information on the width and type of track adopted, the limit of the ramps and the radius of the curves, the weight of the machines and their number of axles, and – not without humour – whether the line was intended for mechanical or horse-drawn traction. Having enquired with the Minister of the Colonies, the Governor General gave the following figures: Width of the track 0.6m, minimum curve radius 20.15m, maximum declivities 35mm/m, locomotives of 9 tonnes able to haul 36 tonnes. With the exception of the information about the locomotives, we may find these very same figures in the Decree of Minister of War Freycinet, dated 4 July 1888. But that Decree concerned the use of 0.6m Decauville tramways inside military fortifications, certainly not the construction of a 108km railway line in Tonkin! In addition, the metropolitan military elite was fairly divided as to the characteristics of strategic networks; the engineers recommended the use of 1m gauge, while the artillerymen swore only by 0.6m gauge. However, the supporters of the 0.6m track were further subdivided into supporters of the Péchot system and supporters of the Decauville system.

Throughout this entire affair, it seems that the Minister of the Colonies permitted himself to be deceived by the supporters of Decauville; but the good deal they had dangled quickly turned into a financial pit. In December 1890, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies declared before the Chamber of Deputies: “I confess, gentlemen, I started work on the railway from Phủ Lạng Thương to Lạng Sơn without having at my disposal the sums which would be necessary to ensure payment.” The role of the metropolitan military is not very clear. Did they want to use Tonkin as a vast testing ground for their “strategic networks?” What must be remembered above all is that the Minister for the Colonies not only acted rashly, but also displayed total incompetence in matters of transportation.

3 Award of the contract and commencement of work

On 24 April 1889, the Minister gave the green light for the construction of the line; he remained convinced that a “serious and rapid study” would show that “the cost of the infrastructure will not exceed 400,000 francs.” In addition to the savings planned on infrastructure, the Minister also ordered that the expenses “of supplying lost or damaged food, and of the mortality of coolies and oxen (curious assimilation!)” should not be taken into account. On 26 April, the Résident Supérieur announced to the Gouvernment General that “studies will begin immediately,” and that the teams would leave the following week. The Minister remained resolutely optimistic, claiming that if the infrastructure dossier reached him before July, the Decauville line could be installed by March 1890.

Earthworks for construction of a cutting, somewhere near Lạng Sơn. Collection C Daney

At the end of the fairly brief study work, specifications were drawn up; it was planned to entrust the construction of the line to a contractor, under the supervision of the local administration.

The successful tenderer had to pay for the material intended for the line, the administration reserving the choice of said material, the discussion of its purchase price, and the supervision of its construction. The successful tenderer was also responsible for transporting the material to Indochina, under its full responsibility; the payment of transport costs was to take place after delivery of the equipment to Phủ Lạng Thương.

The work of establishing the track bed would be determined and supervised by the engineer of the Protectorate, and carried out by the contractor as an “interested party,” who would also be responsible for supplying the necessary manpower.

The laying of the track was to be carried out by a contractor, under the supervision of the Indochina Public Works Department, and the tracklaying work had to advance by least 1km per day. Basically, the future contractor was therefore required to advance the sums necessary for the construction of the railway; the Minister provided for rapid reimbursement, the remainder to be settled in 1896.

The adjudication took place on 13 September 1889, and the winner was a Parisian named Georges Soupe. He immediately created the “Entreprise des Chemins de fer du Tonkin, Ligne de Phủ Lạng Thương à Lạng Sơn.” On 7 November 1889, Soupe requested and obtained an additional clause to the Convention of 13 September: not having the necessary funds to pay the advances he had undertaken to make, he asked the administration to provide him with facilities for finding credit. During the adjudication, therefore, certificates of guarantee were issued, which opened the door to the large banks. The financial situation of the operation thus becoming rather confused, a special account for the railway was created by the Under-Secretariat of State for the Colonies.

Purchases of fixed equipment and rolling stock began from 7 September 1889, the total cost being 2,296,924.50 francs.

All the heavy equipment, from rails to locomotives, was supplied by Établissements Decauville de Courbeil. Hoping to make some savings, the Minister of the Colonies had asked Decauville to provide him with second-hand equipment from the Universal Exhibition. But the company, which had already “hooked” the Minister, had no intention of making concessions; on 7 November 1889, Decauville replied: “We cannot make any discounts on locomotives or on rolling stock emanating from the Exhibition.”

In fact, Decauville delivery was rather piecemeal; a first order for six locomotives soon proved insufficient, and on 18 May 1891, a new contract was made for the delivery of additional equipment, that’s to say two more locomotives and 134 wagons.

On 2 March and 21 April 1890, ships of Messageries Maritimes arrived in Indochina, carrying the first crates of material. Three other ships, chartered by Georges Soupe, would leave in 1890: the “Mount Hebron” on 30 May, the “Dieppois” on 2 August, and the “Craigle” on 21 October. The first material unloaded in Indochina, on 2 March 1890, was a colonial house intended for the personnel in charge of the construction. In fact, all of the railway buildings seem to have been pre-manufactured in France: “A foreman arriving from France says that the buildings have been ordered in Paris and that he saw the Phủ Lạng Thương station completed.” (Letter of 24 February 1891). This led to some disagreements with Tonkinese officials, who were counting on showing off their abilities as builders.

The work really began on 2 March 1890, with great animation; Governor General Piquet telegraphed the Under-Secretary of State for Colonies: “I went to Phủ Lạng Thương this week. I visited the construction sites staffed with Annamite labourers, all working actively and in a much more satisfactory manner than we could have hoped for. Many such construction sites will be set up, in order to finish the earthworks of Phủ Lạng Thương station and the Phủ Lạng Thương-Kép section of the line before the hot season.”

A 0.6m gauge Decauville 0-4-4-0 “Mallet” compound jointed locomotive on display at the Paris Exhibition of 1889

During the Summer of 1890, the sites were prepared and the necessary materials were brought in to work. In September, work began in four different locations, with “many construction sites,” and the first bridges were installed. But the sums involved were already over budget; the concessionaire took the opportunity to try to obtain a revision of the initial agreement, claiming that the contract of 13 September 1889 constituted a simple “opening of credit,” and that he was not obliged to continue his advances beyond the 3,876,106 francs provided for in the specifications; he therefore requested a modification of the latter. However, Fournié, Inspector General of Public Works of Indochina, found most of Soupe’s proposals unacceptable. After difficult negotiations, a compromise was finally reached on 3 November 1890. Soupe obtained an increase in the surcharges due, and some concessions on various technical issues (maintenance and ownership of construction equipment, etc).

As we have seen above, these different financial ups and downs would lead the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies to make amends before the Chamber of Deputies; the main consequence was the vote by the Parliament of Article 45 of the Finance Law of 26 December 1890, which stipulated that “the projects relating to the construction and the execution of railways in Indochina will be provided to the two Chambers and adopted by them. “The Parliament agreed, all the same, to put a sum of 13,100,000 francs at the disposal of the Protectorate of Annam-Tonkin, “to liquidate all the deficits of the previous years.”

At the beginning of 1891, the remaining material on order arrived in Indochina, transported aboard the “Kimloch” (31 January 1891), an unidentified Messageries Maritimes ship (10 February 1891), and the “Teyiet” (20 September 1891). Meanwhile, work on the track bed was actively continuing, and would soon allow part of the line to be put into service.

4 Inauguration of the first section, the starting point of controversies with the successful bidder

On 10 May 1891, a first 10km section of line from Phủ Lạng Thương to Kép was opened to traffic; the trip lasted 45 minutes. The inauguration took the form of a small ceremony, which took place without notable incidents; residents of Lạng Sơn and Hải Dương attended, as well as provincial mandarins, “in the midst of a fairly large crowd of the population.” As for military representatives, they avoided the ceremony, even those from Phủ Lạng Thương. “This abstention, which on such an occasion I cannot explain to myself, was the only detrimental aspect of the day.” (Résident Supérieur to Governor General, Telegram No 621 of 10 May 1891). The Résident Supérieur, assessing the rapid progress of the works, envisaged the opening of the Kép-Bắc Lệ section by the month of October. But he was very optimistic!

The attitude of the soldiers to the ceremony of 10 May was indicative of a prevailing malaise in relation to the railway; on 12 May, the engineer supervising the construction and operation services, Vesine-Larue, resigned following disagreements with the Director of Public Works regarding the construction of the line. It must be said that the Department of Public Works of Tonkin held the successful tenderer and his agents in very low esteem: “The company never organised its sites in a normal and economical way; moreover, until recently it never had the technical representatives who usually work on railways or other such installations. Its representatives were administrators who, in the silence of their offices, thoroughly studied all the clauses of the specifications in order to draw conclusions for their own benefit, while the construction sites were handed over to the direct charge of the cais (corporals) who controlled the workers. To these clauses, we must also mention the notorious incapacity of the site managers, who were recruited without care, most of them being lazy and having never worked” (Report of the Director of Public Works).

0.6m-gauge Decauville 4.5t 0-4-0T (020T) type 3 No 40 “Amiral Courbet” of 1887 hauls freight along the original Phủ Lạng Thương-Lạng Sơn line, Vola Family Photos of Indochina around 1880, railroad building to Lang Son © Julie Vola

With financial problems increasing, Soupe agreed to forgo the “interested party” system and contract out some of the work. At the end of 1891, the Governor General of Indochina entrusted Vezin, a contractor from Hải Phòng, with the execution of the work on the Bắc Lệ line at a price of 73,000 francs per km; the contract stipulated that the line was to be completed by 14 July 1893. Once again, normal procedure was not followed; the Governor-General of Indochina entered into a mutual agreement instead of making an adjudication. Regarding the deadlines, the Protectorate was not, however, the loser in the affair; the section from Kép to Suối Ganh (19km) was opened on 5 October 1892, and that of Suối Ganh to Bắc Lệ (11km) was opened on 10 June 1893. Satisfied with this good result, the Governor General confided to the Entreprise Vezin the construction of the section from Bắc Lệ to Thanh Muôi, and then, on 17 February 1893, that from Thanh Muôi to Lạng Sơn, at a price of 71,600 francs per kilometre. This time, however, Vezin let things go a little; but was he the only one at fault? In 1892, Governor de Lanessan was able to observe “the total absence of studies from Bắc Lệ to Lạng Sơn; whatever may have been said in the past, these studies have never been done, this is admitted by the company itself ” (Report to the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 April 1892). Beyond Bắc Lệ, they entered a zone of active “piracy” and the works suffered. By June 1892, the correspondence of contractors in the Bắc Lệ region were already reporting numerous pirate attacks “which had long since caused considerable disruption in the works”… “the works were still suffering from the passage of pirates, who, having lost their food supplies in every encounter with our troops, then resorted to looting several construction sites, especially those of Cao Son and Sui Si Deo, where they took all the workers’ rice and killed three Chinese.”

The pirates were not the only problem; in April 1892, entrepreneur Eugène Leroy reported: “On the 7th instant, a team of 60 bricklayers was dispersed by the troops and seven workers were executed in the most summary fashion. While the troops kill my bricklayers by day, pirates set fire to my fuel supplies by night.”

Riots sometimes broke out on construction sites; in July 1892, Vezin was taken hostage by his Chinese coolies, whom he had refused to pay, although the affair settled down once the pay arrived. Survival soon became the main concern of the workers; an engineer from the Fives-Lilles company, who was on a study mission between Hà Nội and Pac Lam from 8-20 December 1893, left a rather haunting description of his tour: “From Bắc Lệ, we passed in front of the heads of pirates who had just been decapitated, while the road was strewn with the corpses of coolies who died of fever and exhaustion on the railway construction sites, or of fatigue caused by the transport of food and ammunition.”

All these problems did not impress the Government General, which simply noticed that deadlines were not being respected. In November 1893, it sent to the contractor an official named Lerulle who was responsible for checking a number of unclear accounting issues.

In December 1893, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Lebon notified the Governor General of the decision taken by Parliament to abolish the method of payment defined by the Additional Act of 1889; regions must henceforth be established for further works, which would be paid directly out of the Protectorate’s own funds. Governor de Lanessan therefore turned to the Bank of Indochina which, along with four other banks, agreed on 9 July 1894 to make a loan of six million francs, repayable by annuities from the budget of the Protectorate; whatever the cost to the Governor General, this decision had become inescapable. On 25 May 1894, the Bắc Lệ-Sông Hóa section was opened for operation; and the arrival of new money activated the work on other sections. “During the month of June alone, work was carried out with exceptional activity” notes a report; in July, the Sông Hóa-Thanh Muôi section was inaugurated. There was now only one gap to fill, between Thanh Muôi and Lạng Sơn (29 kilometres).

A train crosses a ravine on a magnificent wooden bridge. The train is made up of an 0-4-0T (020T) type 3 coupled to a small P series axled truck serving as a tender and a 4th class “passenger carriage” M505 being used as a wagon bearing the sign “Force 5 tonnes.” Collection C Daney

5 Discussions with China get underway

In September 1890, Soupe requested “the continuation of the line to the Chinese border gate.” He explained that “this addition is necessary since it would enhance the traffic on the Lạng Sơn line; the consequence would not only be a certain and immediate benefit for this line, but would also help to generate considerable foreign traffic to and from Guangxi.” When the convention of 3 November 1890 was ratified, Soupe inserted a clause stating that “in the event that the administration decides on an extension of the railway from Lạng Sơn to Na Cham,” they would “oblige themselves” to execute this line under the same conditions as that of the line to Lạng Sơn.”

Soupe returned to the charge in 1893, a time which saw him greatly agitated; he sent several engineers and representatives to Tonkin, “responsible for studying on the spot the proper means to activate the works.”

On the other hand, Soupe also obtained the contract for the construction and operation, at his own risk and peril, of the Phủ Lạng Thương-Hà Nội line. For Governor de Lanessan, this line “could be considered, strictly speaking, as a simple tramway.” A letter of 31 May 1893 announced to the adjudicators that they were authorised to begin studies for the extension to Na Cham; however, an agreement was signed the same day, authorising the transformation of the line to 1m gauge.

In 1894, a controversy broke out between the Under-Secretary of State and the Entreprise Soupe et Ravaud; the latter claimed that Minister of the Colonies Delcassé had approved the concession of a railway from Hà Nội to Phủ Lạng Thương and the border, and its transformation into a 1m gauge track. De Lanessan telegraphed: “Found no record of any documents relating to the draft railway contract.” And for good reason, since such a contract did not exist! Only studies of the route had been authorised. The exact role of the Governor General in this whole story is not very clear. In his memoirs, he claims that when he left Paris on 28 September 1894, he had, “in agreement with the Minister of the Colonies, prepared all the acts relating to the extension of the railway from Lạng Sơn to Hà Nội on the one hand, and from Lạng Sơn to the Chinese border on the other.” Did they try to remove an entrepreneur who was to say the least “indelicate”? This is what seems to have been confirmed by the following events.

6 Arrival of the railway in Lạng Sơn

Tonkin, 24 Décembre 1894 – Le premier train arrive à Lạng-Sơn

New entrepreneurs were chosen to complete the line (Entreprise Vola etc …). On the construction sites, fights and desertions were numerous, and the rare civilian supervisors could no longer cope with the situation; on Sunday 20 May 1894, the young Perigordian site foreman Marty was murdered as he tried to intervene in a fight. Military supervisors then made their appearance on the construction sites; at Khe Cai, more than 4,000 coolies were requisitioned; the arrival of this fresh workforce gave new impetus to the project, and it was then estimated that the line could be inaugurated on 1 January 1895.

On 24 December 1894, the railway finally reached Lạng Sơn, terminus of the line, at km 101. The future Marshal Lyautey, then just a humble commander, left us a description of the inauguration: “What a singular day, this inauguration of the railway! At six o’clock in the morning, we left Phủ Lạng Thương, a three-hour drive from Hà Nội. By two o’clock, we were in Lạng Sơn. The line was well guarded, that is true; on all the crests of this torn valley of Sông Thương, where the region of Cai Khinh evokes the wildest parts of Kabylia, there were watchtowers and blokhauses. Nevertheless, all along the valley, the line is now bordered by rice fields, which in the past year have replaced bush; villages have also sprung up near the railway in areas where, according to witnesses, not a single inhabitant would have been seen last winter. This was a pleasure train, carrying almost 200 passengers from Hà Nội, funny people without too many scruples, but alive, intelligent, and outgoing; we do not always know where they come from, or what criminal record they have, but nonetheless they do French work and bring their spirit and their endurance. Men in uniform, officers’ wives, officials in black clothes, this singular unpacking of transplanted French officialdom left again that night for Hà Nội, immediately after the banquet finished. All that was left were the two military staffs, those of the Governor and the General-in-Chief.”

Lyautey was not the only one to have noticed the sudden development of the regions crossed by the new line; In April 1894, while it was still under construction, Résident Supérieur Rodier had made the same observations: “Thanks to the presence on the line of such a considerable number of workers, the markets of the region, previously almost deserted, experienced for some time a significant growth. At Thanh Muôi, one could count from 4,000-5,000 natives from all parts of Tonkin. There were even Chinese coming from Longzhou.”

One could hear much the same story among the administrators living in the border region: “The establishment of the line, apart from the advantages for military transport, provides for the development of commercial affairs in the Lạng Sơn region.”

7 Operation

Station interchange: a squad of Annamese riflemen board a 3rd class type Ke Decauville “Exposition de 1889” carriage

The endemic disturbances which bloodied the region would not fail to affect the railway; if, in many places, they had built small blokhauses intended to protect the line, this was not the case along the whole of its course. On 17 September 1894, at PK72, the Cai Khinh pirates attacked a train in the Cao Sơn cutting. The driver calmly backed up the train to Bắc Lệ station, thereby avoiding a massacre. The next day, the railway again fell prey to the “pirates,” but this time it was much more serious, as a journalist of the time told us:

“Public opinion was already overexcited by the stories of attacks by pirate bands when a new atrocity took place on the Phủ Lạng Thương-Lạng Sơn, this time in broad daylight and within rifle range of the innumerable squads of police troops which guard the railroads, increasing the consternation and anger of our colony, which was so badly guarded and so insufficiently defended. On 18 September, a dissident group led by Ly Ke Koa caused the derailment of a train on the Phủ Lạng Thương line, a little beyond Suối Ganh station. Fortunately, this derailment did not have lamentable consequences. But in the midst of the disorder caused by the accident and the death of the Chinese mechanic, killed on his machine, the bandits jumped onto the carriages, looting goods and taking many prisoners, among whom were two Europeans, MM Chesnay, entrepreneur, and Logion, a Greek subject who was his employee (NDLA: in 1884, Chesnay had founded the newspaper l’Avenir du Tonkin). After this audacious coup de main, accomplished in the full light of day, the bandits retired to the Cai Khinh massif, where, out of reach of our blows, they established their inaccessible lair. A French column, under the orders of the intrepid Colonel Galliéni, set out in pursuit of them.”

Gradually, however, the “pacification” progressed; By 1897, the region was more or less secure, after the submission of the borderlands pirate chief A Coc Thuong. A few months later, Đề Thám and Lương Tam Kỳ (Thái Nguyên province) would also submit.

But by this time Lạng Sơn’s Decauville line was already condemned. At the time the line was inaugurated, some small works still had to be completed, but the whole could be considered finished. If we exclude the few reports which show the impact of the railway on the regions crossed, all judgments made on the Decauville line had been negative; very quickly, the engineer Prévot would complain about the excessive number of European officials on the line, which had unnecessarily increased operating costs. An attempt was made to replace this personnel with local people, who the French authorities nonetheless distrusted: “We can arrange the internal service of the stations in such a way that the natives do not have to handle money.”

But it was above all the conditions of the line that were the object of criticism: “The railway from Phủ Lạng Thương to Lạng Sơn had to be operated first of all under very onerous conditions … We know how it was built; the equipment delivered to operate the line was insufficient, and already tired by the effort of construction “(Report of Rénaud, Director of Public Works, 1898). General Ibos, who found this railway “ridiculous” (an opinion he shared with Paul Doumer), preferred to speak of a “Decauville at 400,000 francs per kilometre.” It should be noted that the USP of the Corneil firm was that “a Decauville railway, with its locomotive, three-classes of carriages and freight vans, costs only around 10,000 francs per kilometre. That’s almost nothing.”

8 Rolling stock

8.1 Locomotives

Six locomotives were delivered by Decauville in 1890: the three small 020Ts, Nos 40, 62 and 80, as well as three articulated compound Mallet 020 + 020T machines (Decauville Nos 84, 85 and 86). Only the 020T No 40 was delivered first to Hà Nội. All other machines were delivered directly to Phủ Lạng Thương. The 020T No 62 “Lạng Sơn” (ex- “l’Avenir”) came from the Universal Exhibition of 1889 and probably also the 020T “Haiphong” No 80. Two other locomotives would be delivered under a contract of 18 May 1891: they were Mallet 020 + 020T locomotives of 9.5 tonnes, equipped with corresponding tenders (Decauville Nos 83 and 126). A sixth Mallet locomotive would be supplied by Decauville in 1894; this machine, which appears on the network rolling stock reports for July 1894, carried the Decauville No 188.

It seems that the Phủ Lạng Thương railway never owned more than seven Mallet locomotives. Some of the machines were fitted with tenders, definitely the last three, which were coupled to tenders Nos 4, 5 and 6, however, were these the first three thus equipped?

8.2 Hauled rolling stock

We don’t really know what the original hauled stock was, but it quickly became insufficient. In January 1891, a number of wooden waggonets were purchased locally for the sum of 16,000 piastres; they were intended for the transport of ballast. Additional material was delivered under the contract of 18 May 1891; it consisted, according to the Decauville classification, of:

– 36 type T wagons with tipping body
– 15 type T wagons with tipping body
– 51 type Pp gondola wagons
– 9 type Pp wagons with screw brake
– 12 type 60c wagons
– 12 type 60c wagons with screw brake

The state of the network material in July 1894 mentions the existence of the following material:

– 1 salon car No S1
– 2 mixed cars of 1st/2nd class series AB1 and 2
– 2 mixed cars of 2nd/3rd class series D3 and 4
– 13 cars of 3rd class series KC 101 to 113
– 6 cars of 4th class series MC501 to 506 (a photo shows the M507)
– 6 vans of series L 401 to 406
– 60 series P and Pb gondola wagons
– 8 flat wagons series Mp1 to 8

Subsequently, the network completed its equipment:

– flat wagons series Mp 9 to 12
– wagons series Mv 13 to 16
– transformation of the Ke 104 car into a mixed baggage-mail van Kp 104

Vue d’une petite locomotive à vapeur, quelque part au Tonkin, Fonds ASEMI, showing a 0.6m-gauge Decauville 5t 0-4-0T (020T) type 3 locomotive

9 In conclusion

The arrival of Paul Doumer in Indochina and the development of the concept of the Transindochinois (North-South line) would sound the death knell for Lạng Sơn’s Decauville railway; in 1896, two years after the inauguration, its transformation into a 1m gauge line began.

In the same year, in New Caledonia, the construction of a railway between Nouméa and Bourail was envisaged. Not knowing which system to use, the Governor of New Caledonia asked for information on the 0.6m track used in Tonkin. The Governor General of Indochina advised strongly against the use of Decauville equipment, because “the results provided by the 0.6m track were not satisfactory.” For Decauville, the Tonkinese experience therefore ended in failure, which explains the little obvious interest in this system in our French colonies.

Drawing of a Decauville 020T type 3 of 5 tonnes, identical to Nos 40, 62 and 80, used with or without tender, Collection J Thévenin

Diagram of Decauville Mallet 020 + 020T locomotives Nos 83 to 86, 126, 188 and 195, used on the Phủ Lạng Thương-Lạng Sơn line, where they were equipped with a tulip coupling instead of a central buffer and chains; they were also harnessed to a tender similar to that of the 020T type 3. Collection J Thévenin

Diagram of Decauville carriages with Ke type “1889 Exhibition” bogies, Collection J Thévenin

The 0.6m track eventually disappeared and was replaced by the 1m gauge track: here in 1902 is the inaugural train of the new Lạng Sơn-Đồng Đăng section crossing the new metal bridge at Kỳ Lừa, with a Weidnecht 130T series 650 locomotive at the head.

Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012) and the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020).

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Access to the Lang-Bian plateau – The Cog railway, getting on a train

At around 10pm on Friday 13 May 1938, the 8pm overnight train from Đà Lạt to Saigon, hauled by SLM HG4/4 0-8-0T cog locomotive No 708, derailed at Kabeu during its ascent from Bellevue. The entire train rolled some way down the mountain, crushing a 4th class carriage and leaving 15 dead and around 20 injured. This is an English translation of an article criticising line safety and management published in L’Effort: journal hebdomadaire, Hanoï, on 17 and 24 June 1938.

“Nice view”

Ar-Lac, Da-Bac, Diêu Trì… so many names, so many catastrophes. And now, Bellevue. This is the fourth fatal rail disaster in less than 10 months. The eighth, if we also count derailments which caused only material damage.

Nice view! I can’t help but think about the cruel irony of these words as I prepare myself for the Dantesque spectacle I will see later. In the meantime, standing on the platform of the rear carriage of a winding train which chugs me towards the scene of the disaster, I admire the long serrated cog rail, located between the running track, which permits trains to climb the mountain.

It’s a beautiful route, admirably constructed. Think about it! This gradient is 12 millimetres per metre!

Of all the railway lines in Indochina, the Tourcham-Đà Lạt cog railway line is the toughest. But also the best built. It was designed and built by German and Swiss engineers, it’s said.

On this track, we have the impression that the risk percentage should not be higher than that of any other railway lines, if the rolling stock was a little less dilapidated. Just a little. But our railroad bigwigs, having been warned about it, rarely risk their own precious persons by travelling on rolling stock which has reached “the limit of its resistance” (Lefèvre dixit), and apparently don’t believe it necessary to safeguard others, namely the passengers. On a gradient of 12mm/m, they put into service eight antediluvian locomotives, all dating from 1932 or before.

Ligne de Krongpha à Dalat – Voie à crémaillère – Krongpha-Dalat line – rack rail

We arrive at Krôngpha. From there, we’ll have to travel by road to reach the site of the disaster. The fireman of the train I travelled in, standing on the station platform, smokes a cigarette nervously. His face is pale. He doesn’t seem very communicative. And that’s a shame. Because I’m curious to know his impressions. Fortunately, the driver is more talkative.

“We must say, Mr Journalist, that our nerves have never been more strained. Stretched to breaking point. At the slightest failure of the locomotive, we believe it’s all over. Because this engine is no better than the other.”
The other being the crashed locomotive at Bellevue.

The fireman suddenly emerges from his silence:
“We’re not cowards, sir! We’ve all driven these machines more than once. But to have to carry on in a pile of junk which is in danger of falling apart by the minute, knowing about it and having to do it anyway, is intolerable. When there is “breakage,” we’re the first victims, and if, by some miracle, we come out of it with just a broken arm or a broken shoulder, it’s off to the hospital and then maybe to jail for us.
Our deceased brother at Bellevue was the best of us. Sixteen years of service. Top marks. The pride of our line. Well, sir, that tough guy was also afraid. Yesterday, before going up the mountain, he said to us as he left the station: ‘Brothers, I’m afraid!’ He knew the locomotive wouldn’t stay on the track.
He’d reported problems more than once. But no-one cared!
How can we not be afraid when we know we may be going to our deaths?”

There was still a small miracle. If the convoy, no longer biting the rack rail and cascading down the slope, hadn’t stopped there at the foot of that mountain, rolling instead a little further, the accident would certainly have been far more horrific. There would not have been a single survivor. Everyone, without exception, would have been crushed to death. The convoy could also have plunged down to the left, over the precipice, and that would have left no survivors either.

The wreckage of the train lies in an area of over 100 metres. The locomotive? It’s now just a heap of scrap metal. Two wheels were detached under the violence of the shock. Below, in the precipice, lies the fourth-class carriage, or rather what remains of it. There, for six hours, 19 people were trapped in agony, buried under a layer of scrap iron, woodwork, stones and earth. A large tomb from which 13 corpses and six dying were eventually removed.

Lang-Bian – Dran plain

Suddenly, a European man with a whip, presumably a supervisor or controller of CFI, charged towards me and shouted: “Get out of here right now!”
Seeing the camera hanging under my armpit, he tore it off violently, and without saying a word, opened it, took out the strip of film, and tore it up angrily.
“No photos, do you hear? And clear off as quickly as possible!”
Such exquisite politeness.

At the scene of the last rail disaster in Da-Bac, it was the same order: Don’t allow journalists to take any photographs. Understanding perfectly why these gentlemen don’t like photos, I retreat under the wrathful gaze of this irascible railway company agent.

On the platform of Bellevue station, I catch sight of a familiar figure: that of Mr Gassier, the big boss of public works, who had travelled down from Hà Nội to contemplate the results of the accident: 17 dead and 23 dying out of 44 passengers.

The causes of the accident are known to everyone. Just three days earlier, the locomotive hauling the ill-fated train had lost its grip on the rack rail and slipped, but at a point on the line where the slope was not steep and the driver was able to stop his machine with the hand brake. The same driver – the “pride of the line” – and the same locomotive. But if this obscure hero had escaped that small accident three days ago, he was still destined for catastrophe.

The expiatory victims

In the depot at Đà Lạt, four steam behemoths are lined up side by side. One of them is still hot and out of breath. Crouching next to it, a man in blue overalls stands in a large patch of grease and oil, wielding a large oil can. On the opposite side, another man hammers heavily.

Đà Lạt, 1940s – La Gare

When we arrive, the man with the oil can looks up. The mechanic who serves as my guide greets him, then we take a little walk around the depot.

“He’s just come in after driving the up express, 300 kilometres in total. Followed by two hours of shunting in the station. Tonight, he’ll drive the down express. Another 300 kilometres and then more shunting in the station.”
I’m stunned.
“And now he has to maintain his machine too? So when will he get some rest?”
My companion shrugs his shoulders,
“He can always rest for an hour or two if his ‘beast’ doesn’t give him too much trouble. Otherwise, he’ll rest tomorrow, after he’s finished taking the down express and done his shunting at the station.
For us, you know, rest, Sundays, holidays, official days off, are all just ideas on paper. We get just four days off per month, and that’s if no colleague gets sick unexpectedly. In the event that one of us gets sick, he must be replaced. So those four days can be reduced to just two.
But let me go and give my colleagues a hand.”

While my companion goes to assist his two comrades, I observe them. All of them have ravaged faces. And they’re all between 25 and 35, that is, all in their prime.
I understand now why they age so early.

They’re now finished. At the station buffet, they throw themselves heavily into the ugly armchairs, wiping large drops the sweat from their brows with the backs of their hands. I offer them a drink.
Both the driver and fireman refuse.
“Well, if you want, you can eat something with us, we haven’t eaten yet.”

Đà Lạt, 1940s – Gare intérieur

Smiling, my companion said to me:
“You could be the unintentional perpetrator of a disaster by offering them something a drink. For us, no alcohol!
But the temptation’s very strong, you know! After 300 kilometres standing on the footplate of our ‘beasts,’ eyes wide open, ears constantly on the alert, we’re running on empty! And with the prospect of having to provide the same amount of exhausting effort that same evening or the next day at the latest, you’ll understand that there’s a strong temptation to pull oneself together with a stiff drink. But woe to anyone who succumbs!” Both the driver and the fireman nod in agreement.

“Already the authorities all too often pour all the fault for any problems onto our heads. We are the expiatory victims, sacrificed to public opinion by our leaders whenever a catastrophe occurs, whether we’re dead or still alive. Whether it’s the Đồng Hới accident or the Da Bac accident or the recent one in Đà Lạt, we’re always the people responsible! No-one ever talks about worn equipment, or poorly made track. Because if there were any question of that, the bigwigs would also have to accept their share of responsibility.”

I try to console them: “Public opinion is not always wrong. For the Diêu Trì accident, for example, the courts sentenced the locomotive driver to one year in prison. But he was then granted a suspended sentence. For public opinion, this was equivalent to condemnation of the senior officials, who they could not dare to drag into the box with the accused.”

But they continue. “Even where we must admit that we caused a catastrophe, who are the real culprits? Ask our masters if they would drive 600 kilometres there and back in less than two days, standing in front of a scorching firebox and constantly staring into the night, not to mention all that exhausting shunting work at the station. Could they do this work? Human resistance has limits.”

Unidentified SLM HG4/4 0-8-0T cog locomotive in the Bellevue Pass

Then, after a short pause to calm his indignation:
“I’ll tell you a little story from last year. Once, when my turn came, my eyes hurt. I protested to the chief traction engineer that working in my state would expose passengers to certain disaster. Because everything depends on the power and the visibility of our eyes. But no matter how much I protested, he didn’t give a damn. So I had to harness my “beast” to the express. For the first 100 kilometres, by some superhuman effort, I managed to drive properly.
But then suddenly my eyes became clouded. I couldn’t see anything. I was blinded, and furthermore lost consciousness. The train was about a kilometre from a tunnel preceded by a steep ramp. Catastrophe was certain.
And at first the fireman and the trainee driver who was travelling with us didn’t notice a thing! But then, fortunately, he saw me collapse and caught me as I fell, while the trainee grabbed the brake. This allowed us to slow down when we got to the ramp. Needless to say, for the rest of the journey, the trainee was driving with the fireman’s help.”

“Ligne de Krongpha à Dalat – chantiers à Bellevue,” janvier 1931 – “Krongpha-Dalat line – works at Bellevue,” January 1931

His companion smiles:
“That fireman was me. It’s fortunate that on that day, or rather that night, we had a trainee by our side, and one who knew the machines better than I did!”
“So there aren’t always trainees on the locomotives?”
“The presence of driver, fireman and trainee is exceptional. The ongoing shortage of traction personnel is such that these apprentices often have to drive by themselves – sometimes even an express. During the terrible accident in Đồng Hới, it was a trainee who was driving!”
“And today?”
“Nothing’s changed. Today is like yesterday and tomorrow will be like today. There are always trainees driving. It would be understandable if we cost too much, but a fireman earns only 35 piastres and a driver 40 piastres a month. Get rid of just one of those numerous engineers who work in management, and we could recruit a dozen more firemen and drivers …”
I can’t help but shudder. Here, I believe, is one of the main causes of so many railway catastrophes!

On the downward journey the train stops suddenly and hisses for a long time. A station? But I didn’t hear the usual whistle that announces scheduled stops It must be a breakdown. How long will it last?
I clamber out of my carriage and walk forward along the track. We overlook a steep precipice of the kind we often see on the Huè-Tourane route and around the Cap Varella. The locomotive is slipping on the track and can’t climb. Discussion between the fireman and the guard. They ask for some volunteers to slide grit under the wheels. A group of good-natured passengers lend themselves to this little task, which amuses them at first, but which, in the long run, becomes tedious.
Eventually they can move the locomotive forward. Slowly. Soon afterwards, we encounter the same problem again! After a quarter of an hour, again with the help of the passengers, the train can creep up the slope. Now it’s going down again. For the descent, we can be confident. It knows how to freewheel. We just hope the brakes are working well!

The problems

The fireman’s incredible admission. The report to the Grand Council of Economic and Financial Interests in 1936 has since been irrefutably confirmed: The rolling stock is “at the limit of its resistance.” And these disasters are not yet at an end. The Đồng Hới accident which prompted this admission was just the start, and the recent Kabeu accident will not be the last. The abyss is the abyss, catastrophes are catastrophes.
The problem needs to be studied again.

We asked a specialist his opinion in order to close this investigation. This is what he told us:

“The two main issues to be studied are: track and traction.

Track

“Cochinchine – Environs de Saïgon, 1904 – Passage à niveau sur la voie ferrée,” Fonds Breton “Cochinchine – Outside Saïgon, 1904 – Level crossing on the railway line,” Fonds Breton

“The cost of building the Réseaux non concédés [CFI] totalled 2,665 million 1928 gold francs, or roughly 5,400 million Daladier francs. The cost per kilometre was roughly 2 million francs, double the average cost in France, 1.9 times that in Algeria, and 1.5 times that in Tunisia. Yet it was the most poorly constructed of all. Some lines already need completely rebuilding!
First, the cardinal crime. Indochina was underestimated by giving it a track gauge of only 1m instead of the international gauge of 1.435m. The 1m gauge track is fine for ‘lines of penetration’ such as those from Hải Phòng to Yunnan-fu, from Blida to Djelfa (Algeria), etc … with a continuous ramp over several dozen kilometres and minimum slopes of 18mm/m. On such lines, 1m gauge track significantly reduces the cost of earthworks, and is faster and more economical to install.
However, the Transindochinois was not a ‘line of penetration,’ and it was also not very difficult to construct. Only the ineptitude of some engineers made construction so difficult. The hardest sections to build were those of the Col des Nuages ​​and the Cap Varella. However, the altitude in those places is only 400m to 600m, with maximum gradients of just 15mm/m.
The 1m gauge track offers much less safety than that of l.435m. The multiple accidents which bloodied the last semester of 1938 came about partly because of this original design error.
The preliminary studies were also very poorly carried out. A track of only 1m gauge should have very few sharp curves, as few as possible. However, I was able to identify on the Transindochinois alone at least 50 sharp curves which needed to be corrected.”

“These already ill-conceived railway lines were then constructed very poorly. It’s no secret that, thanks to the complicity or ignorance of certain engineers of the Public Works Department, contractors involved in building the line were not properly supervised and gave poor results.

“La ligne de Hanoi a Vinh,” Journal officiel de la République française. Lois et décrets, 20 Janvier 1901 – Call for tenders

For the Vinh-Đông Hà section, for example, during the first year of operation of the line alone, around 20 bridges had to be repaired, and earthworks had to be re-consolidated over about 50km of track. Additional cost: 77 million francs (Poincaré francs).”

“The safety of the track is further impaired by the use of lightweight rails of 25kg instead of those of 30kg commonly used on all foreign railway lines, and the use of iron instead of ‘lim’ wood for the sleepers (ties). The multiple drawbacks of iron sleepers (excessive expansion and contraction, poor adhesion to ballast, etc) have been pointed out on several occasions. Yet, despite the abundance of ‘lim’ wood in the country, despite its relative cheapness, despite its advantages in adhesion, we continue to buy iron sleepers.

Traction

“Of the approximately 260 locomotives in service on the Réseaux non concédés [CFI], only about 30 are of recent construction. These are the type 300 “Ten-wheels” and 1000 “Pacifics,” which operate the daily fast-track Hà Nội-Saigon services. And they are only capable of hauling 170 tons on the steepest slopes of the Transindochinois such as the Col des Nuages. The rest of the fleet is junk which is between 20 and 40 years old.
But on the Indochina railways, with its fairly steep ramps, very steep curves, and often fanciful layout, the problem of traction is of paramount importance.
The axle load is, as we know, a crucial factor – the grip of a locomotive depends on its axle load, the pressure pushing its driving wheels onto the track. However, our track and other structures are so fragile that the axle load, that is to say the grip of the wheels on the rails, must be kept to a minimum.
Grip also depends on the number of driving wheels. The more wheels there are, the better the grip.
Hence the need to make the locomotive heavier, at the same time as distributing the weight between the greatest number of wheels. But this multiplication of driving wheels lengthens the locomotive, which in turn presents risks when it enters a sharp bend. Hence the need to articulate the locomotive.

SACM “Pacific” No 1004, decked out for the completion of the Transindochinois in October 1936. Photo Sarthe/Collection José Banaudo

The type of locomotive which would best meet the peculiarities of the Indochina railways is the ‘Garratt’ type, a locomotive with a 4-8-2+2-8-4 ‘Double Mountain’ type wheel arrangement, 23m long and articulated into three sections, which is already widely used on more than 70 networks in Africa and in particular in Algeria.
Such a machine is built especially for the colonial networks, that is to say for 1m gauge track. It can haul not only heavy convoys of goods, but also passenger trains at a speeds reaching 100km per hour.
It can make sharp curves of up to 120m radius and carry 12,000kg of coal and 28 cubic meters of water. It’s worth more than two standard locomotives put together: 23% savings in deadweight and an increase in traction power of 38%. It can cover great distances without refuelling, which saves time and makes real savings in operating costs.
This type of machine is fitted with the latest modern improvements: four cylinders, superheating, powerful braking including a compressed air emergency braking system, lighting in the cabin and front and rear headlights.
For shorter trips, the current pile of scrap would need to be replaced by light and fast diesel-electric locomotives, in which a diesel engine drives a group of electric generators.
An 8-cylinder four-stroke diesel develops a continuous power of 920hp at 700 rpm, the electric generator controls three traction motors which are connected to the machine’s three driving axles. In running order, one type, which measures 15.13m in length and weighs 100 tonnes, can haul a 90-tonne train at more than 100km per hour for a journey of about 1,400 kilometres without refuelling. While diesel-electric locomotives have the disadvantage of high weight compared to unit horsepower, on the other hand, they consume diesel oil, which is said to be cheaper than coal.
Of course, if we replace the locomotives, we also have to replace the wagons, or at least strengthen them.”

Too many chiefs and too few workers

Annam, Tuy-Hòa – 230 “Ten-wheel” No 316 stops at Tuy-Hòa, Document Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer

Let’s take a look at the budget for the Réseaux non concédés [CFI]. We see in the chapter of expenditure just 373,680 piastres for maintenance, repairs and works, 3,129,900 piastres for rolling stock and 4,025,490 piastres for personnel. The staff of the Réseaux non concédés breaks down as follows: 9,556 locals and 180 Europeans. The 9,556 local employees receive only 2,883,090 piastres, while the 180 European staff earn up to 1,142,400 piastres, that is, an average of 630 piastres per month for each European and an average of 302 piastres per year for each local employee.

Now let’s look at the operating expenses by category since 1932.
While the expenses for personnel fell from 1,819,000 piastres in 1932 to 1,263,000 piastres in 1936 for the Northern Network and from 1,115,000 piastres to 773,000 piastres for the Southern Network, the expenses of the Operations Department increased from 59,000 piastres in 1932 to 162,000 piastres in 1935 and 180,000 piastres in 1936.

“There are too many chiefs!” said a railwayman of my acquaintance. Yes, there really are too many chiefs, and they cost too much. For each Arrondissement in the CFI Directorate there is a Principal Engineer assisted by an Engineer Office Chief and three Deputies, one for Traffic and Movement, another for Track and Buildings and a third for Traction. Each of these Deputies in turn have three Assistants, all engineers who each cost the budget over 400 piastres a month.
On the other hand, lower-grade staff are clearly insufficient. And very poorly paid.
In Traffic, a man working in a team gets 14 piastres per month, a handling manager 18 piastres, a brigadier 30 piastres and a team leader 35 piastres. In Movement, a station postman earns 21 piastres, a substitute station postman 29 piastres, a station master 4 35 piastres and a temporary worker 2 45 piastres. The privileged ones, station masters of major city stations, earn just 60 piastres. For the train service, a guard earns 15 piastres, a student conductor 21 piastres. a chef de train 30 piastres and a route controller 45 piastres. In Traction, a trainee earns 21 piastres. a fireman 35 piastres and a driver 40 piastres.

Annam – Krôngpha, c 1935 – Tourcham-Đà Lạt railway line, photo Raymond Chagneau

In return, what a lot of work! I will never be able to forget the words of the mechanic in Đà Lạt: “”For us, you know, rest, Sundays, holidays, official days off, are just ideas on paper.”
An eight-hour day for the telegraph operator who must focus from morning until night on his telegraph machine.
An eight-hour day for the station master who at nighttime must still interrupt his sleep at the sound of the telegraph machine to answer or forward telegrams, to attend the arrival and departure of every express, to update his registers, and to read the tedious circulars which the chiefs throw at him day after day.

What about the 40-hour week? Is the week really just 40 hours for conductors and road inspectors for whom there are no Sundays or public holidays, employees who only have two days off per fortnight? And those two days of rest are often reduced to just one. Because the staff shortage is such that one should expect at any time to be brought in to replace a failing comrade.

And then there’s the conduct of the chiefs, of certain chiefs, of course! Not so long ago, an engineer was witnessed hissing and pouring insults on his subordinates! In important stations, postmen, crew members, etc, are at the same time under the orders of the group leader, the controller, the station master and the deputy station master. Four leaders, four gods who are always angry, who, at the slightest mistake, can issue a written reprimand. However, four reprimands per month result in demotion by one grade. In this way, a station postman was demoted for having received four reprimands in a month: his “crimes” included wearing clogs while selling tickets, forgetting to greet the controller who was on the train platform and whom he had not seen, and smoking when the engineer (who hates tobacco) walked past him!

Gare de Kabeu, 1930

A station master was also sacked when, with a train waiting in the station, he returned to his room at the calls of his wife, who was being assaulted by a controller!

In this service, where one is under the orders of five fathers and three mothers (năm cha ba mẹ), such cases of injustice are common.

The Đà Lạt accident is simply the last straw which has overflowed the already full cup of public outrage.

Across the country there is a huge cry of anger. Let Governor-General Brévié know this and take the necessary reforms without hesitation!

Xuân Tiếu

POST SCRIPTUM: RECIEPTS FROM THE RAILWAYS

The receipts of the railway lines operated by the colony for the first quarter of 1938 reached 819,449 piastres against 521,075 piastres for the same period of 1937, that is to say an increase of 43,107. All the lines contribute to this increase, with the exception of the Saigon-Bến Đồng Sổ section of the Lộc Ninh line, which shows a loss of 766 piastres.
It should be noted that, of these 43,107 increases in revenue, 20,000 may be accounted for by increases in tariffs decided at the last annual session of the Grand Council of Economic and Financial Interests of Indochina.
The remainder, or 23,107, represents the share of the acceleration of business and economic recovery.
The railway management did not find it useful to specify whether this is gross or net revenue. We believe that these figures represent gross receipts, that is to say without deducting ordinary expenses (personnel, maintenance of equipment etc…) and extraordinary expenses (repair and replacement of locomotives and other rolling stock destroyed in the recent disasters).
For the Réseaux concédés [CIY] from Haiphong to Yunnan-Fu. receipts during the first half of 1938 amounted to 2,381,396 piastres, an increase of 79.50%.
The per kilometre revenue on the CIY line is almost 320% of that of the state network.
Another reason which militates in favour of a radical reorganisation of our railways.

Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012) and the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020).

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Translated from the article published in Chemins de fer régionaux et tramways (CFRT), September-October 2014

 Our story begins in Indochina during the French colonial era, when 1m gauge routes stretched for over 3000km, from the north to the south of present-day Việt Nam and as far as Cambodia. Eighty years after their delivery to Indochina, and 60 years after independence, there are still some SACM “Pacific” and “Mikado” locomotives in existence, miraculously spared the decades of destruction.

SACM “Pacific” No 1004, superbly decked out for the inauguration of the Transindochinois in October 1936. The first 10 locomotives of this series very quickly received smoke deflectors. Photo Sarthe/Collection José Banaudo

The administrative framework

In colonial times, the Federation of Indochina comprised Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, which today form Việt Nam, as well as Laos and Cambodia.

In Cambodia, the line envisaged at the outset as a route “from Phnom-Penh to Siam” – now Thailand – was granted in 1928 to the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Sud de l’Indochine (CFSI). It reached Mongkolborey in 1933, but the border crossing (PK 394) was not installed until 1942. In the meantime, in 1936, the failure of the concessionaire had led the Colony to entrust the line’s operation to the administration of Chemins de fer de l’Indochine (CFI). In 1952, the line was transferred to Chemins de Fer Royaux du Cambodge (CFRC), a creation of the “Associated State,” which then became the independent Royaume du Cambodge.

In Laos, the situation could not be simpler, since no public railway line project was ever to succeed in this country.

Within the perimeter of present-day Viet-Nam, on the other hand, the Doumer Plan of 1898 was to distinguish:

(i) A Hải Phòng-Hà Nội line of penetration extending north towards the Lào Cai border bridge to reach the Chinese city of Yunnan-fu (now Kunming) – this line was conceded to the Compagnie française des chemins de fer de l’Indochine et du Yunnan (CIY) and comprised 851km, of which 485km lay in Chinese territory;

(ii) A coastal axis called the Transindochinois, connecting Hanoi with Saigon and incorporating several branches – this network, not conceded to any private company, was built and operated by the colonial administration, then regulated by CFI, and comprised 2,192km.

While the Yunnan line was inaugurated in 1910, the Transindochinois would not be completed until 1936 (see CFRT No 368). After the fragmentation caused by the Japanese “coup” of March 1945, and then by the triggering of independentist actions, the southern sections (Saigon-Nha Trang and branches) and central sections (around Huế) of the line were reestablished and exploited by CFI, becoming the Régie des Chemins de fer du Viet-Nam in 1952, when, according to the terms of the Hả Long Bay Agreement, it was transferred to the “Associated State.”

In Tonkin, where only the CIY Hải Phòng-Hà Nội section and a very brief portion of the former CFI Transindochinois could be reopened, the technical and human resources of the two entities were united in 1947 in a Réseau provisoire ferroviaire commun CIY et RNC au Tonkin (CIY-RNC Provisional Common Rail Network, or RCT). The operation of the RCT was assured by both CFI and CIY, in both cases on behalf of the Colony and using its budgets. In this context, and of more particular interest here, the distinction between CFI and CIY locomotives was subsequently reduced to their registration; all the materials were then commanded and financed directly by the Ministry of Colonies, and it’s this situation which thus enables us to better understand the “expatriation” of the 231-A CIY Pacific locomotives, which were delivered to Saigon, rather than to Hà Nội.

After the 1954 independence agreements, political division intensified the physical divide between the Đường sắt Việt Nam (ĐSVN) networks north of the infamous 17th parallel and those of Việt Nam Hỏa Xa (VNHX) to the south. Regrouping, under the banner of ĐSVN, took place after Reunification in 1975.

[Note: There is no mention here of the more or less durable reopening, after 1945, of local lines in the Saigon region, on which only old and generally light locomotives were running]

Ten “Pacifics,” then 51 “Super-Pacifics”

Tourane, 1936 – A “Pacific” of the first series, seen near Tourane at the head of the long Saigon express, shortly after the completion of the Transindochinois, Photo Sarthe, José Banaudo Collection

After its first successful application on the 1m gauge lines of the Tunisian protectorate, the “Pacific” type locomotive made its appearance in 1933 on Indochina Railways (CFI) as the long Hà Nội-Saigon artery (1730km) drew near to completion. The first delivery was of 10 type 188 locomotives of the Société Alsacienne de Constructions Mécaniques (SACM), numbered CFI 1000 to 1009, and subsequently, 231-301 to 231-310.

Immediately after the completion of the Transindochinois in September 1936, the increase in traffic justified new orders, this time for a significantly strengthened type, designated 194 by SACM, or “Super Pacific” by CFI¹. These locomotives, numbered 231-501 to 231-515, delivered in 1939, distinguished themselves from the outset by hauling long trains of metallic cars at 90 km/h. But the onset of war came to compromise and complicate everything – much more permanently here than anywhere else.

The first four units of the second tranche of “Super Pacifics” rolled out of the Graffenstaden factories from January 1940, and these locomotives, numbered 231-518 to 231-519. could be shipped without a hitch. Shortly after, Indochina was isolated by a maritime blockade. and 231-520, 231-523, 231-524 and 231-525 were reassigned to Dakar-Niger. By cross-checking between incomplete and sometimes contradictory documentary evidence, it can be argued that they would not reach their original destination until 1950². As for 231-521 and 231-522, still under construction at the time of the German invasion of Alsace, they were administratively concealed as “lots of spare parts” in order to escape requisition. In fact, the two locomotives were not completed and shipped until 1947 … and all these setbacks were further aggravated by the absence, for nearly a decade, of six Pacific tenders blocked in metropolitan France and then assigned to the Chemins de fer de Provence (see box below).

Dakar Corpet-Louvet 141 No 17 of Chemins de fer de Provence, seen at the Annot annex in the immediate aftermath of the war with its “Indochina” tender. The protective cover (a passive defence against aerial attacks) was always kept in place between the cab roof and tender. Photo Edmond Duclos, Collection GECP

“Indochine” Tenders in Provence
The passage of the colonies of French West Africa (AOF) to the camp of Free France in 1942 led the State Secretariat for the Navy and the Colonies to find a use in France for nine 141 type tenders which had been completed at the Corpet-Louvet factories in La Courneuve and destined for the Dakar-Niger Railway, but which had been separated from their locomotives. It was thus decided to assign them provisionally to the Chemins de fer de Provence, whose traffic could justify their use.
Six of them (40.017, 40.018, 40.020, 40.023 and 40.024) were delivered from May to July 1943 to the CP network of general interest of the Alps, in Draguignan. Three others (40.021, 40.022 and 40.030) were put into service from September 1943 on the local CP network of Littoral Varcis, in Saint-Raphael.
The construction of tenders having been subcontracted to another manufacturer, it was urgent to find replacements to couple to large Mikado locomotives. On the network of the Alps, makeshift tenders were fitted on flat wagon frames for the “Dakar” Nos 19 and 20, while No 23, sabotaged on its arrival, was never put into service and served as a spare parts reserve. There were therefore six machines left to be fitted with tenders: Nos 17, 18 and 24 of the network of the Alps, and Nos 21, 22 and 30 of the network of the Littoral.
At that time, six “Indochine” type tenders built by the Compagnie française de matériel de chemin de fer (CFMCF) at Tileul, near Maubeuge, were awaiting loading on the Marseille Arenc quay under the responsibility of the freight forwarder Daher. On examination of the available archives, it seems that they were intended for the Indochinese Pacifics, but could not reach their destination because of the hostilities. As the supplier had not been regulated, the credit insurance company which covered this transaction had become the owner and had relocated them to the Secretariat of State for the Navy and the Colonies, which had taken them into account as part of the AOF. The Ministry therefore undertook to resell them (at least those intended for the Alpine network, no archive relating to those from the Littoral having been found) to the two Provençal networks, with a buy-back clause for after the end of hostilities.
Between the Summer of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the six tenders were sent to Draguignon and Saint-Raphael, where they were harnessed to the “Dakar” machines. Once the conflict was over, the locomotives were gradually withdrawn from service between 1945 and 1947. After retrocession to the State, still under the title of AOF railways, the six tenders were shipped to Corpet-Louvet by May 1948 to be renovated there before their final destination … which was therefore Indochina. According to Pascal Béjul’s research, they could have been harnessed to 231-521 and 231-522, which had remained blocked at the SACM factory during the war, to 231-520, 231-523, 231-524 and 231-525, sent temporarily to Dakar-Niger, or to 231-516, 231-517, 231-518 and 231-519, shipped to Indochina without their tenders.
José Banaudo

Việt Nam, 1947 – 231 “Pacific” No 231-003 hauls an armoured train en route from Saigon to Nha Trang, ECPAD Document

During the war years, the Indochina networks suffered very heavy losses and, in March 1946, an ambitious program of rehabilitation motivated new orders, not only for CFI, but also for the private company CIY. However, at that time, the Alsace factory was not in a position to respond to these requests, so these orders were lost to Haine-Saint-Pierre for 231-526 to 231-535 (for CFI), and to Fives-Lille for 231-A-001 to 231-A-006 (for CIY).

This was counting without the harassment of the Việt-Minh, who asserted themselves at the end of 1946 and opposed the resumption of the rail networks by the French: as a result of their actions, hundreds of kilometres of line could never be reopened, so that the needs were drastically reduced on what was recovered. Locomotives Nos 231-529 to 231-533 were “provisionally” allocated to Abidjan-Niger, while in France itself, in 1950, the embarkation of the 231-A locomotives was delayed for several months by the dockers of Dunkirk, who were opposed to the “colonial war.” To add to the confusion, the whole of this small series was assigned to the CFI Saigon-Nha Trang line, so that it was destined never to see “its” CIY Hải Phòng-Hà Nội line.

Even if the renunciation hour had not yet struck, the minimum operation maintained on an amputated and fragmented network could no doubt be served adequately with the existing fleet of locomotives … but despite this, a further, last tranche of 10 units (231-536 to 231-545) was still constructed by SACM in 1947-1948.

A side view of 231-507 – according the Cambodian numbering scheme and after adaption to wood burning. Photo Guy Rannou, Collection Yves Broncard

In Cambodia, a renumbering muddies the waters

Originally, the fleet of locomotives for the independent line of Cambodia had been entirely supplied by the German company Hanomag. Among these machines, two ex-CFSI “Pacific” locomotives were very quickly transferred to Saigon³. This transfer was compensated for by lighter CFI equipment (in particular: 230-300 Cail, then 131-100 Franco-Belge). Other exchanges followed, quite numerous despite the technical heaviness of transport by barge along the Mekong.

On 1 January 1951, five “Super Pacific” locomotives were in the Phnom Penh fleet. In the following year, during the transfer to the CFRC, these were included in a total of 10 locomotives of this type, which were soon renumbered as 231-500 to 231-510, a renumbering undertaken locally for the whole fleet – which means, confusingly, that that the current Cambodian 231-501 is not the 231-501 CFI locomotive of 1939!

The documents which have come down to us unfortunately do not allow us to determine the original “identities” of these renumbered Cambodian machines, with the two exceptions of 231-505 and 231-509 CFRC, which, in 1988, bore construction plates corresponding respectively to those of the former 231-538 and 231-542 CFI. We can therefore only suppose that the 1952 renumbering aimed to give an appearance of homogeneity to a stock which perhaps mixed ex CFI 231-500 locos together with ex-CIY 231-A locos, and we can also argue that this core of 10 ” Super Pacifics” was then to remain unchanging, because, after decolonisation, the relations between the two states of Việt Nam and the Kingdom of Cambodia would be sufficiently distant (a euphemism!) for any further exchanges to appear highly improbable.

“Super Pacifics” flourishing in Phnom Penh at the end of the 1950s: 231-500 ready for departure; 231-507 and 231-502 in the fuel parc, with bulky stacks of wood; 231-508 has just entered the station; as has 231-507, viewed from the upper floors of the main building of the station. Photos Guy Rannou, Yves Broncard Collection

Three decades later, 231-508, originally CFI 231-542, was in store at Phnom Penh… it is still there in 2014. Photo Paul Carenco

The “Mikados” and their descendants

In mid-1946, SACM put into construction the first “Mikado,” its type 203, which differed from its predecessors only by the configuration of its axles, better adapted to the heavy and slow trains of a network ravaged by war. But the persistence of unrest in Indochina would profoundly affect the history of these locomotives, which was even more confused, if not painful to write about, than that of the “Super Pacifics.” For the orders initially planned, we note a distribution of attributions between CFI (141-501 to 141-528) and CIY (141-A-101 to 141-A-115)… of which the last deliveries would, however, only be partially implemented, when the prospect of a “liquidation” of the networks was no longer in doubt.

Locomotives 141-501 to 141-516 CFI began leaving the factory in 1948 … but, as with the contemporary “Super Pacifics,” their deliveries were disrupted due to the “general situation” in Indochina. Five locomotives of this batch (141-508 to 141-512) had to be “loaned” to Congo-Océan, after provisional conversion to 1.067m gauge. This loan, attested to by several documents, but about which we lack precise details, was extremely brief and ended at the start of the 1950s. In addition, eight other locomotives, inventoried by SACM as type 203-bis, were built specifically for the French Equatorial Africa network⁴.

Close-up of 141 No 141 (!) of the Mozambique Railways, ex-50301 Congo-Océan. Deprived of its smoke deflector screens and carrying an American-style headlight and faceplate, the locomotive is almost unrecognisable … but it is nevertheless a sister of the Indochina “Mikado”, with its tank tender. The lighting emphasises in particular the rear side beams, which allowed the widening of the firebox. Photo AE Durrant/DR

In any case, in its inventory of 1 January 1951, CFI identified twelve 141-500 locomotives, distributed as follows:

– six in service of their southern network,

– three in service of their central network,

– three “in the course of assembly,” meaning that shipping had been carried out in disassembled elements (chassis, boiler, superstructures).

Units 141-517 to 141-528, ordered in 1947, were delivered in 1950 and 1951. Curiously, neither the manufacturer’s documents, nor those of the Office Central des Chemins de fer d’Outre-mer (OFFERFROM)⁵, seem to “know” the last unit, whose existence is only attested by a photo of it taken after an attack. Moreover, in the Autumn of 1949, CFI had sought to cede, to third-party networks, 16 of their “Mikado” locomotives which were still under construction, and which, in an increasingly difficult context, they no longer required. But no-one was interested in taking these locomotives, and while awaiting a decision, OFFERFROM was forced to take delivery, having them stored for many months in a warehouse located in Albert (Somme), together with a great deal of other rolling stock which had also been ordered for Indochina.

Tourane, 1951 – SACM Mikado No 141-525 was initially sent to Congo before its eventual delivery to Indochina

Tourane, 1951 – SACM Mikado No 141-508 was initially sent to Congo before its eventual delivery to Indochina; it’s seen here at Liên Chiểu

In addition to these measures, taken “for budgetary reasons” though no doubt concealing the loss of all hope of new redeployments, the government added the cancellation of a new order for 15 “Mikados” which had only been placed a few months earlier.

The same causes would produce the same effects in relation to the 141-A locomotives destined for CIY, whose order was reduced from 16 to 10 units in May 1949, then reduced again to only eight units in the following year. These locomotives, 141-A-101 to 141-A-108, were put into service in 1951 and 1952 on the Hải Phòng-Hà Nội line, the last operational line of the CIY concession.

After the 1954 independence agreements, North Việt Nam seems to have inherited about ten “Mikados” including at least seven of the eight 141-A ex-CIY locomotives, and South Việt Nam more than 20, all of them of CFI origin. Moreover, it is now established that 141-515 found refuge in Phnom Penh, where it was renumbered as 141-551 CFRC⁶.

No 141-165, of Chinese manufacture, seen hauling a freight train in Hà Nội in 2001, shortly before steam haulage was brought to a definitive end in Việt Nam. Photo Paul Carenco

No 141-158, also a Chinese built copy of the SACM Mikado, which has been set up as a monument in front of the Hồ Chí Minh City Station, photographed in December 2013. Photo Michel Garel, Source: Piotti

In South Việt Nam, the American takeover, materialised by the contribution of about 50 diesels from the General Electric construction line, marked the death warrant for steam locomotives – most of them were left abandoned by the end of the 1960s. It was quite different in the North, where the Communist regime remained faithful to the machines inherited from the former colonising power. The 141-A ex-CIY locomotives lost their “A,” and the 141-500 ex-CFI locomotives taken over by ĐSVN were renumbered in sequence after them, from 141-109 onwards; after Reunification, some 141-500 locomotives from the centre and/or the south were transferred to the north, where ĐSVN rehabilitated and renumbered them, to at least 141-115⁷.

And they did not stop there: in 1964, the workshops of Gia-Lâm built locomotives Nos 141-121 and 122, replicas of the SACM “Mikados,” which resulted from a subtle mixture of “cannibalisation” of the cancelled machines, use of spare parts, identical machining and, of course, ingenuity. When the liaison between Hà Nội and Saigon was re-established, it was undoubtedly on purpose that No 141-121, which had become an object of national pride, was placed at the head of the inaugural Unification Express, at least for its arrival in Hà Nội on 4 January 1977.

In addition, these two locomotives were followed by Nos 141-151 to 141-216, built by Chinese industry between 1965 and 1974, making in total no less than 67 “copies.” So the plans of SACM had not been “lost to all the world!”⁸

As late as 1992, it was still possible to see SACM “Mikados” hauling expresses from Saigon between Hà Nội and Nam Định (87km). They were then among the very last French steam locomotives in regular service anywhere in the world. After the complete dieselisation of the network in 2002, it seemed that all the steam locomotives had gone, but their Chinese-built “sister,” 141-158, was installed as a monument in front of the new station in Hồ Chí Minh City, ex-Saigon. Faced with this escapee, how can we not recall a very old rule: over time, the success of a plagiarism always ends up constituting the most beautiful tribute that we can pay to the authors of the original!

Forgotten … and nevertheless legendary

Restored Cambodian No 231-501, last survivor of the “dynasty,” pictured on 26 March 2014 running around its train at Komar Reachea, PK47, on the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville line

In essence, and without taking into account the “copies” of Vietnamese or Chinese execution:

– 61 “Pacifics” and “Super Pacifics” were built for CFI and CIY.

– 36 “Mikados” were built for the two networks, and this type of locomotive was reproduced in a total of 44 examples, including the Congo-Océan lot.

With a total of 105 units, these locomotives have formed a truly exceptional “large family” in the history of French 1m gauge steam traction, even unique if one considers only the decades 1930 to 1950. In addition, through many of their technical features, the Indochina 141 and 231 locomotives presaged the famous 142 and 242 GELSA locomotives of 1951-1953, also of 1m gauge, which were to constitute the definitive design of the French “school” of steam locomotive.

And yet … due to their remoteness, but also perhaps due to the discredit thrown on the 1m gauge track by some and on colonisation by others, the “Pacific” and” Mikado” locomotives of what was French Indochina have never known the notoriety of their counterparts which worked the large metropolitan networks, except of course with those who experienced the epic adventures of the armoured trains and “Rafales,” already more than 60 years ago.

The independentist attacks of the years 1946 to 1954, although innumerable, did not bring about the complete disappearance of all locomotives; most often, the damage could be repaired in the workshops, where every unit of the fleet would experience several successive stays. After 1964, the bombings of the “American War” were more destructive, but several “Pacific” and “Mikado” locomotives survived them all the same, to accomplish their tasks until very recent dates.

In Tonkin, at the end of the 1980s, nine “Pacifics” and “Super Pacifics” (231-302, 231-309, 231-524, 231-525, 231-527, 231-528 to 231-530 and 231-533) could be found parked out of service, but 231-534 was still in operation in Hà Nội, while seven “Mikados” out of a total of nine (141-102, 141-103, 141-105 to 141-110 and 141-115 according to the numbering of ĐSVN) could be found hauling trains to Nam Định, Lạng Sơn and Hải Phòng.

At the same time, in the former South Việt Nam, entirely converted to diesel, Nos 141-507 and 141-510 had just been scrapped, and only the wrecks of the 231-A-003 and 231-A-006 of CIY origin could still be seen dumped in Nha Trang.

In Cambodia, after minimal dieselisation, almost all of the fleet survived the destructive madness of the Khmer Rouge to reach us today. In Phnom Penh, we know that the 231-501 – according to the local numbering here – has just been restored to life; 231-502 to 231-505, as well as 231-508 and 231-509, are stored and seem almost complete, along with 141-551, ex-141-515, last of the SACM “Mikados;” 231-506 and 231-507 are badly degraded; and only 231-510 seems to have disappeared.

Is it necessary to add: Can the hopes of preservation and transfer to France of one of these locomotives, which in 1992 were concentrated on 231-534 in Hà Nội, be considered today as definitively dashed?

Another regret: since the publication of Frédéric Hulot’s book, a quarter of a century ago (see bibliography) some persistent enigmas have certainly been elucidated … but there are still many unanswered questions! Thus, it is feared that the details of the origins of most of Cambodia’s miraculous survivors, as well as the service records of expatriate locomotives in Africa, will remain forever unknown.

On 22 June 1953, a Việt Minh attack on the railway in the Hải Vân Pass precipitated Việt Nam’s worst-recorded railway disaster. A strong explosive charge was detonated just as a 15-coach passenger train double-headed by two brand-new “Mikado” 141-500 locomotives arrived at the Baika viaduct (km 761). The viaduct collapsed and the entire train plunged into a ravine, killing more than 100 passengers and crew. Photo Sarthe, Collection Jose Banaudo

Three steam locomotives, or nothing!
Around 1959, when all the colonial networks were engaged in a forced dieselisation, Indochina Railways swore by their “Super Pacifics” and “Mikados.” This position, against the tide of opinion, was justified by the qualities of these locomotives, and it was also explained by Indochina’s abundance of water resources and, in the north, by the relative proximity of the Tonkin coal mines … but that was not the only reason.
Lúc Raynaud reports that an administrator of OFFERFROM, after having masterfully demonstrated to his audience how “a single diesel locomotive replaces three steam locomotives,” heard himself answered by a leader of the CFI: “Well as for me, I keep my three steamers. because, when the Việt-Minh sends one to the bottom of a ravine, I still have two left to pull my trains.” Unstoppable!
It was this mixture of common sense and determination, reinforced by the incredible ingenuity of Vietnamese and Cambodian railway workers, which explains why some of these beautiful locomotives were able to survive through those tragic decades ….

The “Pacifics” of 1933

Schematic diagram and ex-works photo of SACM-Graffenstaden 2-8-2 “Pacific” No 1008, future 231-309 (SACM No 7688, 1933), Collection André Lepage

The 1933 series, later 231-300, was presented by SACM as a reduced version of the “Pacific” that it had built in 1914 and then in 1928 for the Tunisian metropolitan areas. In fact, the lighter rail of the first-completed sections of the Transindochinois limited the axle load to 11 tonnes. The manufacturer succeeded in reducing the empty weight from 51.9 to 48.8 tonnes, while increasing the power of the locomotive, thanks partly to the enlarged grate and heating areas and the increase in stamp boiler pressure from 12 to 14 hpz, but also through the application of some of the principles of André Chapelon: thus did they conduct “an in-depth study of the exhaust steam and smokebox gas ratios” and adopt the Kylchap exhaust.

The main deviation from the designs of that illustrious engineer, a simple expansion, was justified by the narrowness of the space between the side beams, which hardly permitted the accommodation of an interior mechanism, and undoubtedly even more by the imperative of facilitating both driving and maintenance.

It was specified that the length of the grate should not exceed 2.50m, “in order to facilitate correct heating by colonial staff.” The manufacturer also reproduced the provisions which characterised the Tunisian type, with a “special type of frame which accommodated a wide and deep firebox between the side beams” – the main side beams stopped at the front of the firebox, while the rear ones were extended to embrace the firebox, beyond the third coupled axle, so as to achieve a rigid assembly.

The diameter of the coupled wheels, fixed at 1.50m on the Tunisian “Pacifics,” was reduced to 1.40m on their Indochinese descendants, an arrangement which a metropolitan operator would not have classified in the prestigious category of “big wheels.”

The other characteristics were classic ones: thus, the mechanism included numerous parts which were interchangeable with previous types of locomotives – 230 Cail and Fives-Lille in particular – to take into account delays in workshop supplies, and several weeks of navigation from the metropolis.

The “Super Pacifics” of 1939

Schematic diagram and ex-works photo of SACM-Graffenstaden 4-6-2 “Pacific” No 231-502 (SACM No 7742, 1939), Collection Bernard Rozé

These locomotives, intended to circulate primarily on the last sections of the Transindochinois to be built, whose heavier equipment permitted a load increased to 13 tonnes per axle, constitute a reinforced version of their predecessors at 54,250 tonnes.

The maximum load was only reached on the three coupled axles, and, by adjusting the suspensions, it was possible to modify the distribution of the mass between coupled and load-bearing wheels and thus allow service on sections fitted with light rail, axle load then being reduced from 13 to 11 tonnes and the adherent weight from 39 to 33 tonnes.

The main advance was an increase from 1480mm to 1586mm in the diameter of the boiler, the length of which, however, remained unchanged. The “Super Pacific” thus had the same length of 4.60m between the tube sheets as their elders, so it could use the same tubes – in this case more numerous. With a stamp pressure of 14-16hpz, the power amounted to 1340hp. The tractive force of 9480kg allowed haulage of loads of up to 350 tonnes on inclines of 10‰ or 280 tonnes on inclines of 17‰.

Among other improvements, we should note the moulded steel cylinders lined with cast iron, the semi-automatic Henricot couplers⁹ and the smoke deflector screens, whose geometry gave these locomotives a typically French appearance.

The “Pacifics” and “Super Pacifics” both received the same type of bogie tender, which weighed 14.4 tonnes and allowed 16m³ of water and 6 tonnes of coal to be carried. The first series of 1933 was intended for an in-service speed limit of 80km/h, but the first locomotive No 1000 in the series reached 94km/h during tests. The “Super Pacifics” were designed to run at 100km/h, but they were limited to 90km/h in current service. However, this only applied to the brief period of peace experienced by the first units to be delivered, as their post-1945 cadets are unlikely to ever have reached such speeds on the battered wartime networks.

The “Mikados” of 1948

SACM-Graffenstaden 2-8-2 Mikado 141-500 schematic diagram, plus ex-works photo of 141-501, Collection Bernard Rozé

Appearing almost a decade after the “Super Pacifics,” the “Mikados” differed from them only by their wheel arrangement – and even the rear bogie was identical for the two types: the SNCF itself would never achieve such a degree of standardisation with its so-called “unified” locomotives!

With their four pairs of coupled wheels, the “Mikado,” however, presented an increased mass of nearly 3 tonnes. The reduction in the diameter of these coupled wheels from 1.40m to 1.20m brought the speed in service down to 60 km/h, but the tensile force was increased to 10,700kg. These locomotives were able to haul trains of 680 tonnes on a 10% incline or 400 tonnes on a 17% incline.

In addition, the brevity of the “Congolese episode” involving Nos 141-508 to 141-512 CFI suggests that the adaptation of this type of locomotive to the 1.067m track had been planned from their design, though no known text confirms this¹⁰.

The first “Mikado” received the same tenders as the “Pacifics” and “Super Pacifics,” but the following ones – the majority – carried “tank tenders” built by Baume-&-Marpent.

The North Vietnamese and Chinese “variations” of the SACM “Mikado” were distinguished from the basic type by their firebox made of steel rather than copper. In addition, they were instantly recognisable by their smoke deflector screens of larger dimensions, which had a very particular shape.

All these locomotives and tenders could subsequently be adapted to coal (North and South Việt Nam) or wood (South Việt Nam and Cambodia) firing.

Pictured at Giáp Bát is No 141-165, a locomotive of Chinese construction whose profile nonetheless permits us to perceive the French influence. Photo Paul Carenco

Finally, in North Việt Nam:

– The Soulerin vacuum brake was replaced by the air brake, which explains the appearance, on all three types of machines, of fairly large air reservoirs between the screens and the smoke box;

– The old draw gear was replaced by automatic couplers.

Main sources:

Anonymous – Notice in Bulletin de la Societe Alsacienne, 1934

Frederic Hulot, Les Chemins de Fe de la France d’Outre-Mer: Indochine – Yunnan, Ed. La Regordane, 1990

Richard Pelham, Some Vietnam Puzzles, in Continental Railway Journey, 1992

David Gurnett, railwaysinvietnam.com website, 2013

Michael Pass, Cambodia Steam Today and Yesteryear, 2014

Acknowledgments: to Didier Delattre, Fabrice Lanoué, Yves Broncard, Luc Reynaud and Bernard Rozé

Footnotes

1. Obviously, these locomotives did not share anything other than this name with the famous 3-1200 of the Compagnie du Nord (231-C SNCF)

2. The total number of “Pacifics” delivered to Dakar (four), then to Abidjan (five), is corroborated by the allocation to the budget of French West Africa (AOF), at the beginning of 1949, of nine “Mikados” ordered for replace them in Indochina … but at least five of the “loaned” locomotives nevertheless made it to their destination, since 231-524 and 231-525 (ex-Dakar-Niger) and 231-529, 231-530 and 231-533 (ex-Abidjan-Niger) were present in Việt Nam in 1988 – restitutions having more than likely pre-dated independence.

3. These “Phnom-Penh Pacifics” (series CFSI Nos 1-7 then CFI 231-401 to 231-407), of German design and execution, have no other point in common with those which constitute the subject of this text other than their axle configuration.

4. The eight “Mikados” built specifically for the Congo-Océan were ceded to Mozambique in 1956; it is in this territory that the complete surveys have been carried out which today make it possible to confirm their “identity” (see table)

5. OFFERFROM: Office Central des Chemins de fer d’Outre-mer, Central Office of the French Overseas Railways; this organisation would become OFFERFOM after the independence of 1960 and would only intervene in the networks of French-speaking Africa and Madagascar

6. The original “identity” of this 141-551, which had quite intrigued us when we only knew of it through a photo of Guy Rannou, is today attested by its SACM number 8042.

7. The concordance between old and new numbers could not be established

8. At the end of the 1980s, discussing No 141-151 and its successors, an official letter from the ĐSVN Directorate, addressed to British tour operator Bill Alborough, did not hesitate to specify: “our Chinese friends faithfully copied the plans for the many locomotives they built for us.”

9. The Henricot coupling, which also fitted the passenger cars delivered to CFI at the same time, could be hidden by a removable buffer plate when the locomotive was attached to a train set comprising only conventional components. In fact, this equipment was not used widely on the non-conceded networks and it does not seem to have been planned for Nos 231-A-001 to 231-A-006 CFI.

10. In this hypothesis, the “universality” of the 203 SACM type would approach that of many more 141 USA-TCs known as MacArthur, which could be adapted to the track gauges of 1m (Cambodia, Tunisia, Franco-Ethiopian etc), 1.055 m (Algeria) and also 1.067m for, in particular, several British possessions.

11. We are unable to specify the construction stages to which each of the two types of tenders has been associated; in addition, exchanges also could be observed later in Việt Nam, where, for example, 231-534 was accompanied by a tank-tender during its last months of activity.

Pascal Béjui

Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012) and the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020).

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Hà Nội, May 1978 – “GP6” 2-8-2 locomotive No. GP6-1004 pauses at Đông Anh Station with a slow freight bound for Lạng Sơn, photo Đường sắt Việt Nam; Đầu máy hơi nước GP6-1004 kéo chuyến tàu chở hàng qua ga Đông Anh hướng về Lạng Sơn, 5-1978. Ảnh: Đường sắt Việt Nam

The new Flickr collection Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam is being developed as an archive of old and contemporary photographs and other documents relating to the history and development of Việt Nam’s railways and tramway networks, organised in albums according to railway line, railway installation, type of locomotive, etc.

It’s a work in progress which still has many gaps, so those interested in Việt Nam railways with relevant photographs, old or new, which they would like to include (with full photographer’s credit, of course) should contact me.

Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012) and the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020).

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Thế Giới Publishers (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới) is pleased to announce the launch of Exploring Quảng Nam, the latest English-language history-heritage guidebook by Tim Doling.

Over 500 pages long and packed with useful maps and images, Exploring Quảng Nam is aimed primarily at independent travellers who wish to learn more about the region’s rich history and heritage.

Mỹ Sơn B group Chàm temples

The book starts with a detailed historical overview of the region, once the heartland of the ancient Chàm kingdom of Amaravati, with its capital at Trà Kiệu and religious centre at Mỹ Sơn, a kingdom which derived much of its wealth from maritime trade. When the Nguyễn lords assumed power there in the late 16th century, they quickly recognised and exploited the potential of the former Chàm port of Faifo (Hội An) on the Thu Bồn River, subsequently generating sufficient wealth from taxation on foreign merchant shipping to finance an ambitious programme of conquest and settlement in the South. Meanwhile, their palace-fortress at nearby Thanh Chiêm (modern Điện Bàn) became a second Nguyễn dynasty capital, administered as an appanage of the Nguyễn Crown Prince, where visiting Jesuit missionaries were able to develop the earliest form of the Romanised Vietnamese language quốc ngữ.

Regarded initially as a gateway to Faifo, Đà Nẵng emerged in the early 19th century as a maritime port in its own right, largely as a consequence of the gradual silting of the Cổ Cò and Thu Bồn Rivers. In 1835, Emperor Minh Mạng declared it the sole international port permitted to receive Western ships, and in 1888, Đà Nẵng was transformed into the French concession of Tourane.

Thọ Nhơn Chinese Cultural Centre (Trung tâm Hoa văn Thọ Nhơn 壽仁華文中心), formerly the Five “Bāng” Assembly Hall at 407 Phan Chu Trinh (photo by Hoàng Vũ)

Notwithstanding its relative political and economic insignificance during the colonial era, Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng re-emerged after partition in 1954 as a region of great strategic importance. Designated as the headquarters of the Army of the Republic of Việt Nam (ARVN)’s I Corps Tactical Zone in 1955, Đà Nẵng became a major US base after 1965, accommodating an estimated quarter of a million US, South Vietnamese and allied troops by 1968. Today, Đà Nẵng is one of the fastest-developing cities in Việt Nam, an important trade and tourism hub and beach resort which serves as a gateway to neighbouring Quảng Nam province, with its two UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Sites of Hội An and Mỹ Sơn.

The book’s 15 tour chapters take visitors on a journey of discovery through the wider region, with six suggested heritage tours in and around Hội An, five suggested heritage tours in and around Đà Nẵng, and additional suggested heritage tour routes for visitors to Mỹ Sơn, Hòn Lao island (Cù Lao Chàm), and Southern Quảng Nam, including the provincial capital of Tam Kỳ.

Hoành phi or horizontal board bearing the Chinese characters 来遠橋 Lai Viễn Kiều, “Arriving from afar bridge”

There is also a short chapter introducing the newly-emerging attractions of Quảng Nam’s Far West districts. The book concludes with a guide to the historic street names of both Hội An and Đà Nẵng.

With plans already under way for a post-pandemic revival of inbound tourism, it’s hoped that Exploring Quảng Nam will help to boost the tourism sector in the Central region by providing greater depth to the visitor experience and encouraging longer stays, more repeat visits and more sustainable tourism practices.

Exploring Quảng Nam is on sale from major bookshops in Việt Nam, price 350,000 VNĐ. Customers overseas can order copies directly from Nhà xuất bản Thế giới in Hà Nội – please contact Ms Vũ Thanh Thủy, Marketing & Distribution Department, 84 (0) 38 955 5666, email vuthuynxbtg@gmail.com

Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, 2012) and the guidebooks Exploring Huế (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2018), Exploring Saigon-Chợ Lớn (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2019) and Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020)

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

Điện Hải Citadel – location and future restoration plan

Điện Hải Citadel today on Google Maps

Visitors often tour Đà Nẵng City Museum without realising that it’s located in the grounds of one of Việt Nam’s few intact Vauban citadels.

One of Việt Nam’s few intact Vauban style fortresses, the Điện Hải Citadel originated in 1813 as an earthen fortress located to the north of its present position.

Enlèvement des lignes cochinchinoises de la rivière de Tourane (8 Mai 1859) from Victor Duruy, Histoire populaire contemporaine de la France, Tome 4 (1864-1866) – note the depictions of Đà Nẵng’s two principal fortresses, An Hải (left) and Điện Hải (right)

It was in fact one of two fortifications – the other being An Hải on the east bank – built by Emperor Gia Long to protect the port. By the time of American mariner John White’s visit in 1819, both Điện Hải and An Hải had been rebuilt in brick.

In 1823, Gia Long’s son and successor Minh Mạng saw the need for stronger defensive works, so the original Điện Hải fortress was rebuilt “on a high mound” at the current location. It was upgraded from a fortress (đồn) to a citadel (thành) in 1835.

The current citadel dates from a further reconstruction of 1847, undertaken by Emperor Thiệu Trị in the wake of the sinking of four Vietnamese warships by the French frigates Gloire and Victorieuse in the harbour. Built according to the Vauban principles of military architecture (see previous post, The Citadels of Gia Dinh), it was a smaller version of the 1837 Gia Định Citadel (Saigon), square in shape with a circumference of 556m, 5m high walls, four diamond-shaped corner bastions, and a 3m deep surrounding moat.

Intérieur du fort de l’Ouest après le bombardement, au moment de l’enlèvement des pièces de canon abandonées par les Cochinchinois, d’après les dessins de M. A. Theil, à bord de la Némésis

The citadel had just two gates – the south (main) gate and the east gate – and housed an out-of-town royal palace, an army barracks and storage facilities for food, ammunition and gunpowder. Around the walls were 30 cannon emplacements.

Known to the French as the Fort de l’Ouest, Điện Hải Citadel suffered extensive damage during the Franco-Spanish invasion of 1858, although since that first French campaign ended in failure, it was subsequently repaired and returned to use.

Following the establishment of the French concession of Tourane in 1888, the colonial authorities found the citadel too small to accommodate their own armed forces and instead established new infantry and artillery barracks nearby on what later became boulevard Jules Ferry, now Trần Phú street.

In 1888, the Hôpital militaire de Tourane was set up in the grounds of the citadel. Though primarily a military hospital, it also served expatriate civilians – initially, anyone with a serious illness had to be evacuated by ship to the Hôpital de Huế, but in the wake of the devastating cholera epidemic of 1903-1904, it was understood that the existing health facilities in Tourane were inadequate.

Annam – Tourane – Hôpital

A second hospital, the Hôpital indigène de Tourane, was established in 1906 on boulevard de la République (now the site of the Đà Nẵng University of Medicical and Pharmaceutical Technology at 99 Hùng Vương) to serve the local population. Then in 1909-1911, the military hospital was upgraded and rebranded as the Hôpital européen de Tourane, in which capacity it continued to serve Tourane’s military and civil population for the remainder of the colonial era.

It was also inside the Citadel in 1900 that the devout General Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes, Commandant-in-chief of French troops in Indochina and Grand officier de la Légion d’honneur, sponsored the construction of Tourane’s first Roman Catholic chapel.

This remained the principal place of Catholic worship in the city until the inauguration of the larger parish church, now Đà Nẵng Cathedral, in 1924.

Annam – Tourane – Église de Tourane

After 1955, the French government obtained the agreement of the RVN government to set up a Francophone school in the old hospital buildings of the Điện Hải Citadel, with additional school buildings outside its main east gate. Known initially as the École Française de Tourane, it was renamed the Lycée Blaise Pascal de Đà Nẵng in 1964, and offered a secondary education leading to the baccalauréat. Among its students of this period was the famous musician Trịnh Công Sơn. In 1967, the school was transferred to local management, switched to a Vietnamese syllabus and renamed the Nguyễn Hiền Education Centre (Trung Tâm Giáo Dục Nguyễn Hiền), continuing to function in this capacity until 1974, when the school was closed and its buildings became part of the recently-established Quảng Đà Public University (Trường Đại học Cộng đồng Quảng Đà, established in 1971).

Statue of General Nguyễn Tri Phương in front of the present Đà Nẵng City Museum

Soon after Reunification in 1975, the buildings inside the citadel were taken over by Quảng Đà Dermatology Hospital (Bệnh viện Da liễu Quảng Đà), but then in 1976 they were handed to Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng Pharmaceutical Company (Xí nghiệp Dược phẩm Quảng Nam-Đà Nẵng), later the State Pharmaceutical Company 5 (Xí nghiệp Dược Trung ương 5). Finally in 2004, the pharmaceutical company was relocated elsewhere, the land was cleared, and a new Đà Nẵng City Museum building was constructed, opening to the public in 2008.

Although increasingly dwarfed by new high-rise buildings, the old citadel remains intact, thanks to its recognition on 16 November 1988 as a national monument. In recent years it has been recognised that the 2008 museum building was inappropriately located and precluded the proper restoration of the Citadel as a heritage site in its own right. In 2017-2018, temporary housing which had threatened the integrity of its west wall was cleared and the moat was reinstated.

At the time of writing the Đà Nẵng City Museum is being relocated to 42-44 Bạch Đằng, in order that the existing museum building may be demolished and the Citadel may be fully restored to its appearance before the French conquest.

Getting there
Thành Điện Hải, 1A Lý Tự Trọng, Phường Thạch Thang, Quận Hải Châu, Đà Nẵng

Images of Điện Hải Citadel in 2013, before the removal of temporary housing and reinstatement of its moat:

Tim Doling is the author of the guidebook Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020)

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.

One of the American War’s most intriguing revolutionary vestiges has survived in Đà Nẵng’s historic Ngũ Hành Sơn district.

Many Đà Nẵng visitors and residents are familiar with the old Nước Mặn helicopter base (21 on the map above), which is situated next to the Đà Nẵng-Hội An road in Ngũ Hành Sơn district.

Part of the 1965-built USAF helicopter base has survived, and is currently home to a cement factory, though it retains its runway and several clusters of Hardened Aircraft Shelters.

Nước Mặn Airbase pictured in 1968

Some are even aware that the nearby Đà Nẵng Hospital for Women and Children (Bệnh viện Phụ sản Nhi Đà Nẵng) at 402 Lê Văn Hiến, GPS Coordinates 16.022961, 108.249772 (22 on the map above) originated as the NSA Station Hospital, which opened in January 1966 and eventually becme the largest combat casualty hospital in Việt Nam, with nearly 600 beds.

Yet relatively few people seem to be aware of the existence of the former K20 underground resistance base (23 on the map above) which once operated little more than a stone’s throw to the west of it.

This secret base was originally set up by the National Liberation Front (NLF) in 1962 in an area of 4km² beneath the former villages of Đa Phước, Nước Mặn, Mỹ Thị and Bà Đa. The subject of a major display in Đà Nẵng Museum, K20 functioned right down to 1975 and comprised at its height a dense network of up to 157 interconnected secret cellars and tunnels which were used for the storage of weapons and as a base for NLF commando units. They were also the staging point for devastating attacks on Nước Mặn USAF Helicopter Base in October 1965 and January 1968.

Main gate of K20 Resistance Base in tổ 5, khối Đa Mặn 1, phường Khuê Mỹ

Most of the secret tunnels have long since disappeared and much of the area (situated immediately west of the Đà Nẵng Women and Children’s Hospital) now resembles a large building site. However, a few surviving houses in the riverside area of what is now Đa Mặn 1 village still retain their secret tunnels, and in 2010 these were collectively recognised as a provincial monument.

You may start your visit at the K20 Traditional House (Nhà truyền thống K20) (A on the map above) , GPS Coordinates 16.021549, 108.241992, which opened in 2016. Designed in traditional style with a double yin-yang tiled roof, it is accessed by a three-entrance gateway with four square pillars (trụ biểu).

K20 Traditional House (Nhà truyền thống K20) at K20 Resistance Base

The Traditional House houses a large model showing the location of K20 Revolutionary Base, and contains various displays (mostly in Vietnamese) introducing the history of the area from the late French colonial era through to the present day. It recounts the earlier struggle of local people against the French, the construction of the secret cellar and tunnel network starting in 1962, the setting up of the Nước Mặn (Marble Mountain) USAF Helicopter Base in August 1965, and the attacks on the airbase in October 1965 and January 1968.

Displays include a cutaway model of the secret tunnels beneath K20, tools used in their construction, clothing, equipment, weaponry and even a motor bike used by revolutionaries, a diagram showing how the 27 October 1965 attack was carried out, and models of several of the K20 buildings which have secret cellars or tunnels beneath them. The Traditional House also features a map showing NLF operations in relation to US/ARVN bases in Hòa Vang-Đà Nẵng, pictures of Vietnamese government officials and foreign dignitaries who have visited K20, an overview of how the area has developed since 1975, and a display on the “Heroic Mothers” of K20 who lost their sons and daughters to the struggle.

One of the old secret cellars at K20 Resistance Base

Friendly staff members are always happy to conduct visitors on a circular walking tour of the village to see some of the surviving revolutionary vestiges of K20.

Right next to the K20 Traditional House is the Nguyễn Văn Family Temple (Nhà thờ Tộc Nguyễn Văn 阮文祠堂) (B on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.021350, 108.241761, with its shrine to family patriarch Nguyễn Văn Vinh, who married a local woman and settled here in 1883. Extensively refurbished in 1930 and 1961 and rebuilt in 1994, it was used as an administrative centre during the August Revolution of 1945, and later functioned as a secret revolutionary meeting house and planning centre. Behind the temple is a secret cellar which was used to hide documents, weapons and ammunition.

Mrs Nhiều’s Temple at K20 Resistance Base

Continue to the House of Mr Huỳnh Trưng (Nhà ông Huỳnh Trưng) (C on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.020855, 108.243114, where a secret tunnel built in 1968 remained in constant usage right down to 1975. The stele outside reads: “In this house, Mr Huỳnh Trùng created a secret bunker to hide wounded revolutionary soldiers during the entire period 1968-1975 – Registered Monument.”

The septuagenarian owner of the house, a young cadre at the time of the war, proudly invites visitors into his family temple, opens a secret door beneath the main shrine and leads his guests into a cramped hidden space. With a torch, it’s possible to locate the hole in the floor which was used to access an underground escape passageway leading out to the fields bordering the riverbank.

Your circular tour will bring you next to the Huỳnh Family Temple (Nhà thờ tộc Huỳnh 黄族祠堂) (D on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.021452, 108.243578, a shrine to the ancestors of the Huỳnh family, which relocated into this area from Huế in 1765.

Family temple with secret tunnel in the House of Mr Huỳnh Trưng at K20 Resistance Base

Completely restored in 1994, it was also equipped with a secret storage cellar as early as 1946, and also played an important role as a secret meeting place and training area through two successive wars. It was recognised as a municipal monument in 2005.

A network of tunnels and underground rooms also once existed beneath the recently-restored Mrs Nhiêu Temple (Nhà Thờ bà Nhiêu) (E on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.021578, 108.242813, outside which a stele reads: “Mrs Nhiêu Temple. She dug six secret tunnels which functioned as the headquarters of the Thành Ủy Đà Nẵng Revolutionary Committee while they directed the revolutionary movement in 1945-1975 – Registered Monument.” Today, the entrance has been bricked up for safety reasons to discourage visitors from descending into what remains of the tunnel network, which is flooded and partially collapsed.

The House of Mr Huỳnh Miên (Nhà ông Huỳnh Miên) (F on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.021578, 108.242813, on the corner close to the main entrance was also linked to the secret cellar network, though it is not currently open to the public.

Stele outside the House of Mrs Nguyễn Thị Hải

On your way back to the main road, you may wish to visit one more K20 monument which is located outside the main vestiges area. Head c300m northeast along đường K20, then fork right onto Nguyễn Đình Chiểu street. Around 120m along this street, just after an alley on the left, you’ll see the House of Mrs Nguyễn Thị Hải (Nhà bà Nguyễn Thị Hải) (G on the map above), GPS Coordinates 16.022129, 108.246575,.

The stele outside reads: “The House of Mrs Nguyễn Thị Hải is the place where the first secret tunnels were built in Đa Mặn to hide cadres taking part in revolution from 1962 to 1964. Two interconnected tunnel systems could once be accessed through hatches in the floor beneath a rear building, but the partial collapse of the structure a few years ago left only one small cellar accessible

In a city where many historic structures have already been lost in the headlong rush for modernity, it can only be hoped that other important heritage sites like K20 Resistance Base can be saved for future generations.

Getting there
Khu ăn cứ K20, Phường Khuê Mỹ, Quận Ngũ Hành Sơn, Thành phố Đà Nẵng

Tim Doling is the author of the guidebook Exploring Quảng Nam (Nhà Xuất Bản Thế Giới, Hà Nội, 2020)

A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.